

May 26, 1966

of Local No. 45 of the United Rubber Workers Union, and Vice President Willard E. Bittle and Labor Relations Manager Thomas J. Nelligan of Uniroyal, Inc.

Representing the United Rubber Workers of America were: George Burdon, international president; Peter Bommarito, international vice president; Sal Camelio, director, District No. 2; Keith Prouty, research director; S. A. Bercaro, Local No. 21914, Watertown, Mass.; Oscar R. Carlson, Local No. 21914, Watertown, Mass.; William DiSalvo, Local No. 220, Bristol, R.I.; Edward Benemels, president, Local No. 220, Bristol, R.I.; Leo Jolly, president, Local No. 224, Woonsocket, R.I.; Rudy L. Perusse, Local No. 631, Middletown, Conn.; and Al Demers, president, Local No. 137, Andover, Mass.

Representing New England footwear companies were: Charles A. Cameron, B. F. Goodrich Co., Watertown, Mass.; M. A. Sousa, Bristol Manufacturing Corp., Bristol, R.I.; T. J. Meyers, Good-year Rubber Co., Middletown, Conn.; S. A. Stone, Converse Rubber Co., Malden, Mass.; David A. Golden, tariff counsel, Rubber Manufacturers Association, New York; P. W. Koval, U.S. Rubber Co., Woonsocket, R.I.; and Mitchell Cooper, Esq., Rubber Manufacturers Association, Washington, D.C.

This meeting has served to emphasize the true nature of the Customs Bureau's new guidelines, and to point out their lack of legal justification. Although the Bureau would seek to minimize the effect of the recent tariff cut by labeling it a revised method of evaluation, I have been informed by the Customs Bureau itself that the implementation of its revised valuation methods will result in an \$8.8 million loss of revenue on the 60.8 million pairs of footwear already involved.

Congress has prescribed the proper and legal mechanism for such tariff concessions in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The provisions of this act require the Tariff Commission to investigate the probable economic impact and effect on domestic employment before such tariff reductions may be granted. Moreover, the letter and spirit of the Trade Expansion Act direct that such concessions be reciprocal. The Customs Bureau's new guidelines actually reduce the tariff on rubber-soled footwear by at least 35 percent without any investigations or report on the economic impact on domestic industry and employment, and without obtaining any reciprocal concessions from our trading partners.

The effect of this action is to present our domestic rubber footwear industry and its employees with the burden of this gratuitous tariff cut as our U.S. negotiators prepare for negotiations in the Kennedy round at Geneva which may further reduce this already-eroded tariff. In fact, the domestic industry has been exposed to the added risk that the American selling price system of valuations itself may be negotiated at Geneva.

Obviously we are up against serious odds in this battle and the high stakes involved make our concerted constructive efforts all the more necessary. With this in mind it was very encouraging for me to note the large turnout of mem-

bers of the New England delegation at our meeting Wednesday and the willingness of all these members to participate in efforts to restore the original tariff level. I think that the excellent presentations of factual data on the economic impact of increased foreign competition made by representatives of labor and industry were adequate to direct our immediate attention to the restoration of the original tariff base.

I consider it an honor to have been appointed as chairman of the committees established by the meeting to expedite favorable consideration of my bill, and other bills on this subject, and to take other steps discussed at the meeting. The courses of action outlined at our meeting offer a number of possibilities with great potential and we should pursue each of them without delay. The committees established at this meeting will arrange to meet with officials of the Treasury Department to investigate the reason for the tariff reduction and to present data on the impact of foreign competition on domestic employment, and all other necessary and desirable steps will be taken.

I am confident that these measures, in conjunction with our continuing efforts to obtain hearings on H.R. 12983 in the Ways and Means Committee, will prove productive, and I am especially pleased with the progress which was made at Tuesday's meeting.

#### LET'S GIVE A SECOND CHANCE TO REHABILITATED VETERANS

(Mr. McVICKER (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, I have introduced a bill to alleviate a situation that has too long gone unheeded. I refer to the more than 500,000 Americans holding a less than honorable military discharge. This hangs over their heads, regardless of the fact that many of them have sought to lead exemplary lives since leaving the military service of the United States.

One young man has two honorable discharges in addition to an undesirable. He is ineligible for reenlistment or change of discharge in order to obtain decent employment.

Another young man has an unsuitability discharge which has been changed to honorable, but under a service regulation which still renders him "unsuitable." As a result he can only do menial work, although he is quite young and seems to have exceptional intelligence.

Yet another is married with three children. He comes from a deprived background, and cannot get work because of his dishonorable discharge.

My bill would allow, under proper evidence, awarding of a rehabilitation certificate to certain of these citizens who qualify under its terms. By amending title 10 of the United States Code, it would aid those veterans who could adequately prove rehabilitated conduct for at least a 3-year period.

Certificates would be issued by the De-

partment of Labor, with the Secretary of Labor authorized to establish boards to receive and act upon applications for them. Evidence submitted to the boards would include statements signed by law enforcement officials, persons acquainted with the applicant, and his employer, if any. Boards could then conduct independent investigations.

Those individuals receiving the certificate would then be eligible for job counseling and employment placement, as these benefits are denied to them under existing law, thereby working severe hardships upon many of them.

Mr. Speaker, I feel many of these veterans deserve this opportunity to ease their lot and that my bill, once passed, will give them a better springboard towards better lives.

#### PATIENCE, PERSEVERANCE, AND PERSPECTIVE CALLED FOR IN VIETNAM

(Mr. STRATTON (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, when this country undertook to declare its independence in 1776 we had problems. There were ups and there were downs before we were fully free and operating as a fully democratic society. We even had to fight a long and bloody civil war before the principle was finally accepted that one region of our country could not just go off and set itself up on its own and thumb its nose at the established authority of the country just because they did not happen to like it.

But with patience and perseverance we prevailed, Mr. Speaker. Neither Rome nor the United States of America was built in a single day. We need just a little perspective when we see the things that are happening today in Vietnam. Let us not panic. Let us take the long view. The birth of a nation, like the birth of an individual, can take time and is often painful. But our forces are doing well in Vietnam. Let us not throw away the achievements and the sacrifices they have made just because the news from Da Nang and Hue and Saigon may be disturbing at the moment.

In that connection I commend to the attention of my colleagues an admirable editorial that appeared in the Washington Post for May 25:

#### LESSONS OF ADVERSITY

The crisis in South Vietnam is producing a great deal of reflection in this country, not only about the United States role there, but about the American role elsewhere in the world where like situations may arise. Painful as this reflection may be, it is necessary, useful and constructive as a means of developing policy in a democratically governed society. Instruction based on theoretical example is never as well remembered as that derived from actual experience. The experience we are living through now is a teacher we cannot despise.

The critics of American presence in South Vietnam make some accusations that are not easily answered. They say South Vietnam is a very small country, and this cannot be denied. They say it is a very weak country,

May 26, 1966

and this can hardly be disputed. They say it is a very divided country, and no one can gainsay it while Buddhists are attacking the troops of their own government and those of its allies, while Catholics and Buddhists stage demonstrations and counterdemonstrations. They say that it never has had and does not now have familiarity with democratic institutions and that is true. They say that South Vietnam lies in an area of Chinese Communist influence and in close proximity to Communist power and this cannot be contradicted.

It is only at grave risk that a great power assists a small, weak and divided country to resist aggression. The lesson seems plain. Hereafter let United States assistance be reserved for victims of foreign aggression only when they are large, powerful, united, democratic and far away from any Communist power. Such assistance will not involve us in the great risks that are involved in helping the small, the weak, the divided and the vulnerable. The great and powerful nations we assist will make good use of our aid. They will not fritter it away. They will not waste their strength and ours in internal bickering and quarreling. Their efficient, peaceful and capable utilization of our aid will be a source of continual satisfaction and expanding power. Thus we shall make our large friends invulnerable, ourselves secure and obtain peace in our time. Once the world has grasped our policy, Communist nations will attack only small countries, inasmuch as we will defend only large ones, there will be no more East-West conflict.

Of course, there will come a time when all the small, weak and divided countries have been reduced by aggression. But any war that follows that development is bound to be cozy close at hand. In order to fight it, we will not have to run the risks of transporting troops great distances. Our soldiers will not have to give battle in strange surroundings or in a disagreeable climate. They will not be exposed to the temptations of alien brothels but can revel in the luxury of home-grown sexual immorality.

Such are the lessons of adversity to be gained from the difficulties encountered in South Vietnam.

#### JOSEPH ALSOP SAYS WE ARE WINNING IN VIETNAM

(Mr. STRATTON (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, last month when the subcommittee which I had the honor to head, returned from an inspection trip to Vietnam, we reported to this House, as the Record for April 27, that we found the military situation going much better in Vietnam than most people back here had been led to believe. We said we believed our forces were winning the military war in Vietnam.

Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, not much of the national press paid much attention to that story. Somehow the press seems to favor those accounts which reflect unfavorably on our commitment in Vietnam and play down those accounts that favor it.

The report of the gentleman from California (Mr. Moss), for example, which was highly critical of our foreign aid dealings in Vietnam got banner headlines in Washington and around the country.

Yet the statement of the Governor of Pennsylvania, a former Member of this

body, in Vietnam on a visit, saying he felt our military operations there are going well got almost no coverage here.

That is unfortunate, Mr. Speaker. It gives the people of the country a misleading and distorted view of the actual situation in Vietnam.

I do hope that perhaps the unhappy experience of some 90 American and foreign press representatives in Da Nang the other day, which was reported in the Washington Star on Tuesday, by Mr. Richard Critchfield, as an experience in which "the scales had fallen from the eyes of some 40 American and foreign newsmen" as regards the real motives of the antigovernment Buddhist demonstrators in Vietnam, may perhaps mean that we can look for more accurate and less consistently biased reporting and photography in the future.

In any case, Mr. Speaker, I was delighted to see that the optimistic view which our subcommittee reported to this House a month ago is now supported by no less distinguished a reporter than Mr. Joseph Alsop, who has just returned from Vietnam and whose report appears in the current, June 4, issue of the Saturday Evening Post. I am sure Members will find his analysis of considerable interest. I am, therefore, including it at this point in the Record:

#### WHY WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM (By Joseph Alsop)

In Vietnam, great numbers of Americans are now committed to a war which very few Americans even begin to understand. Most of us, of course, have a fair understanding of the issues our troops are fighting for, but only a tiny minority understand the war itself.

This has struck me with increasing force after every one of my more recent visits to Vietnam—and I have been there 16 times since 1953. People talk about other matters such as the chops and changes of politics in Saigon, where the Communists might manage an eventual victory—although I do not think they will. No one ever mentions the fairly desperate combat problems that now face the Viet Cong. No one analyzes the present strategy of our brilliant field commander in Vietnam, Gen. William C. Westmoreland. No one refers in any way to what is currently happening on the battlefield. Yet the battlefield is where our own best hope of victory lies.

The whole pattern of the fighting, as it happens, is still determined by an almost successful gamble that the Communist made to win the war last year. Hence we must backrack a bit at the outset in order to see the timing, the nature and the risks of this enormous Viet Cong gamble, to make what happened reasonably comprehensible.

Many normally well-informed persons still believe that a Communist guerrilla movement like the Viet Cong is something spontaneous—halfway, let us say, between a misguided patriotic society and a nationwide game of cops-and-robbers. From their first obscure guerrilla origins, however, the Viet Cong have been a second government of South Vietnam, and they still are. Furthermore—and here is the important point—this clandestine Communist second government has all the fiscal, economic, manpower and other problems that plague any normal government. Since this is also a government at war, the V.C. second government's biggest problem is naturally to recruit, equip and maintain its armed forces. This has always been the biggest problem, and its difficulties caused the Viet Cong gamble already mentioned, which was decided on in late 1963

after the coup d'etat against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.

South Vietnam in the summer of 1963 was a country in which every province had its own civil war, with the Saigon government controlling the provincial capitals and a good many villages, with the V.C. second government controlling a good many other villages, and with troops of both sides in the field everywhere. By that time, there was a Viet Cong provincial battalion of about 500 men operating in each of Vietnam's 43 provinces. There was a Viet Cong district company of about 150 men operating in each of at least 250 of the administrative districts into which the provinces are subdivided. And in each of several thousand V.C.-controlled villages and hamlets, there was a Viet Cong guerrilla band of 20 or 30 men to maintain local discipline and to harass friends of the established government in neighboring villages and hamlets. All these V.C. soldiers—about 50,000 in the local forces and 110,000 in the guerrilla bands, or approximately 160,000 men in all—had to be paid and armed and kept supplied with ammunition and much other matériel, and all but the minority of strictly part-time guerrillas had to be provided with rations as well. Salaries and rations also had to be found for tens of thousands of Viet Cong in essentially civilian occupations, ranging upward from humble couriers and tax collectors, through secret policemen and the personnel of the medical services, to the awe-inspiring members of the Communist Party's central committee for South Vietnam in their remote jungle lair near the Cambodian border.

In addition, this second government was deeply engaged in a big and costly program of military public works. The rule books for guerrilla war, written by Mao Tse-tung and his remarkable Vietnamese Communist pupil, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, lay down an absolute requirement for guerrilla main bases in areas immune to penetration by hostile troops. The mountainous, jungle-covered and swampy tracts of South Vietnam provide splendid terrain for many such main-base areas. But barracks, hospitals and numerous other facilities had to be secretly built within these fastnesses. Wherever the ground was suitable, the main bases also had to be fortified by an almost inconceivably antlike program of digging and tunneling; and although *corvée* labor from V.C.-controlled villages was used for this purpose, the hundreds, even thousands of men in the *corvées* at least had to be given rations while away from home. Finally, all the main bases had to be prestocked with medical supplies, ammunition and food. This was an enormous undertaking in itself. A single underground cache found last year, for instance, contained no less than 2,000 tons of rice. Since the cache was in a huge hole approachable only by a narrow tunnel, all this rice had evidently been carried in on men's backs, bagful by bagful.

Early in 1963, moreover, the first main forces—their nature will be explained in a moment—had begun to be mobilized in the main-base areas. Therefore, long before Diem was assassinated in November, 1963, the Viet Cong leaders had to meet a pretty imposing total budget. Their clandestine second government then controlled no more than about four million of the total South Vietnamese population of 17 million. Few legally established governments of countries having only four million people manage to keep more than 160,000 men under arms at all times, even if their soldiers are paid the merest pittance, as are the soldiers of the Viet Cong.

Such was the position when the Diem regime was brought down by an army coup, and almost the entire structure of government control abruptly came to pieces, for a while, in almost every province. The Viet Cong were thus enabled to surge forward

everywhere, and this led to the decision to begin organizing main forces on a really big scale.

Like everything else the Viet Cong had done up to that time, the move to organize the main forces was strictly in accordance with the rule books of Chairman Mao and Gen. Giap. Main forces (the classification is Mao Tse-tung's) bear little resemblance to the simple guerrilla bands that almost everyone envisions when the Viet Cong are mentioned. They also differ sharply from the local forces—the provincial battalions and district companies, which are already well above the guerrilla level—for the main forces have no permanent regional attachments, and their units are much larger and more heavily armed. In fact, they almost exactly resemble regular troops in a regular army. According to the Mao-Giap rules, these main forces have two functions: to help the local forces and guerrillas increase the pressure everywhere, until the established government is visibly hanging on the ropes; and then to strike the knockout blows in big set-piece battles like that which finished off the French at Dienbienphu.

With more than 160,000 men already under arms, and with the additional organization of something like a brand-new regular army now decided upon, the V.C. second government obviously had its work cut out. At the outset, all went easily enough. In the secret main-base areas, with their palm-thatched barracks, their deep-dug, jungle-hidden fortifications and their painfully accumulated supply caches, large numbers of Viet Cong cadres and recruits were now assembled for regimental training. The new main-force regiments had a strength of around 1,500 men each. In design they were roughly comparable to regular light-infantry regiments of 30 or 40 years ago, and they had the capability of being joined together in light-infantry divisions for the knockout blows that were expected later. Each regiment was given an attached porter battalion of about 500 men to handle its local supply and transport. To get all these men, recruiting was stepped up in all the V.C. areas of South Vietnam. A major expansion of the supply movement from North Vietnam, down the Ho Chi Minh trail and along the sea-smugglers' routes, was also undertaken to provide the new regiments with their 57 mm. recoilless rifles, heavy mortars, antiaircraft guns and other crew-served weapons. And many more specially trained cadres were brought down from the Communist North to become officers and noncoms.

By New Year's Day of 1964, at least five of the new main-force regiments already had been recruited, armed and trained. By this time, too, because of their post-Diem surge, the Viet Cong controlled perhaps five million to six million people. Even so, however, the second government's base in the countryside—the Viet Cong infrastructure, as our intelligence officers call it—was still too small to support the ambitious military superstructure that was planned. To complete the plan, the masks had to be dropped. This was the Viet Cong gamble. If Gen. Westmoreland's strategy attains the hoped-for results, this dropping of the masks will be remembered as the moment when the Viet Cong began to lose the war. But it did not look that way at the time.

Until 1964 the Viet Cong had always worn two masks—one to deceive people abroad, the other for the South Vietnamese themselves. For foreign eyes, they had worn the mask of an indigenous movement of social discontent. However, as early as 1956, Le Duan, now first secretary of the Communist party of North Vietnam, had gone south to make preparations for the beginning of guerrilla war, with the aid of many thousands of cadres whom the Communist government in the North had ordered to go underground in the South when the French war ended in

1954. From Le Duan's arrival onward all the higher direction of the V.C. had come from Hanoi. The northern Communist government had also provided large quantities of military equipment and had secretly sent further tens of thousands of cadres to the South to aid and guide the struggle there. But all this was hidden well enough that those who wished could go on claiming that this was "just a civil war."

The other mask, worn to deceive the simple people of South Vietnam, was vastly more important and valuable to the V.C. This was the mask of amiable agrarian reformers—the same mask that the Chinese Communists had worn with such success until they got control of China. Until the critical period we are now examining, the Viet Cong also wore this mask with great success, thereby gaining rather solid popular support in their "liberated areas" and seriously softening up every contested area. The success ultimately depended, however, on something much more important than Communist propaganda or V.C. land reform. It depended on a convincing pretense of government by consent, which was impossible without a considerable degree of real consent. To gain this degree of consent, the Viet Cong promised the peasants, again and again and with utmost emphasis, that there would be no V.C. taxation and no V.C. conscription.

These promises were approximately kept until the year 1964. Devious, even cruel, tricks were often resorted to, of course. A potential recruit's government identity card would be stolen, for example, and he would then be frightened into volunteering by warnings that the government police would shoot him as a Communist if they ever picked him up. Or an obstinate noncontributor to the Viet Cong war chest would be "struggled with" by V.C. cadres before all the people of his village, and if this public brainwashing did not get results, he might then be shot in the back of the neck as a "spy for the reactionaries and imperialists." But in the main, the V.C. military outfits really were manned by volunteers, which made the average outfit both tough and highly motivated. And in the main, besides road tolls, market tolls and the like, the V.C. tax collectors only asked the people of the villages for "voluntary contributions," which meant that the burden on the peasantry was light and easily bearable.

The trouble was that this semi-voluntary system reached its limit with the creation of the first five or six main-force regiments, as did the system of largely concealed aid and direction from the North. If the masks were retained, enough men and resources to complete the war plan simply could not be secured, and both masks were therefore boldly and simultaneously dropped. Beginning in 1964, all the main forces and many of the provincial battalions were completely reequipped with the new 7.62 mm. family of Chinese-made weapons, which required a supply movement from North Vietnam too big to be hidden any longer. At the same time, preparations also began for the eventual invasion of the South by complete units of the North Vietnamese regular army. Thus the pretense was abandoned that this was "just a civil war." At the same time, and incomparably more important, the pretense of governing by consent was also quite ruthlessly abandoned.

The repeated Viet Cong promises that there would be no V.C. taxation and no V.C. conscription became dead letters. Taxes were sternly imposed on the people of the villages. Quarter by quarter the Viet Cong increased these levies until they became cruelly burdensome. Universal military service was proclaimed for all males from 18 to 36. As the manhunt progressed, the Viet Cong press gangs began rounding up boys of 14 or 15. All this was a gigantic gamble, for the V.C. had now broken the first and most sacred

rule of Mao Tse-tung: Popular support of the guerrilla movement must never be endangered until the final victory. But the Hanoi leaders and the V.C. high command clearly believed that the gamble could never go sour, simply because they were so certain of an early victory—after which, of course, any grumbling in the villages could be dealt with by secret police.

To insure the expected victory, they brought off a feat probably without parallel. Although they were still no more than the second government of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong between January, 1964, and the early spring of 1965 wrung from the unhappy villages enough men and resources to increase the V.C. main forces to 24 regiments, complete with porter battalions, or the equivalent of eight army divisions. Even so, this was not enough to meet the war plan's requirements. Hence the second government undertook the considerable further responsibility of maintaining and providing porter battalions for two complete divisions of the North Vietnamese regular army, the 325th and the 304th, which covertly invaded South Vietnam in late 1964 and early 1965. By the spring of 1965, therefore, besides 160,000 troops in the V.C. local forces and guerrilla bands, the second government could boast a main-force army of the strength of 10 light-infantry divisions. And this new army, with its porter battalions and longer range supply detachments, numbered close to 800,000 men. The achievement was astonishing, but the price was heavy. One can imagine the Viet Cong finance minister—they have one, even if his name is not publicly known—groaning when he learned the true scope of the main-force program. And one can all but hear his colleagues airily telling him not to worry, because victory was just around the corner.

It is almost unknown in America, but the truth is that a Viet Cong victory really was just around the corner in the late spring of last year, months after the situation had been supposedly saved by President Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam. Throughout the spring of 1965 almost the whole South Vietnamese army was firmly pinned down in the provinces by the urgent requirements of local defense. In those spring months almost the whole of the army's slender mobile reserve, 13 South Vietnamese ranger and Marine battalions, was also being chewed up by new main-force regiments. By mid-June, after the bloody fight at Dong Xoai, about 60 miles from Saigon, only three of the government's reserve battalions remained in good combat trim. Meanwhile, the Viet Cong had an uncommitted central reserve equivalent to at least five divisions in their main-base areas. No reserves on one side, strong reserves on the other, meant, of course, that the V.C. could win province after province by concentrating in heavily superior force wherever they chose to do so. In this manner they could count on rolling up South Vietnam like a carpet before the summer ended. Then President Johnson upset their calculations by ordering the commitment of U.S. troops on a big scale.

This order had all the elements of brilliantly successful, if wholly unintentional ambush, and like every good ambush, in the first place, it was a complete surprise. There had been an earlier surprise in February, when the President gave the order to bomb the North after the Viet Cong attack on the Pleiku barracks. But this second surprise was quite as complete as the first, and it was far more terrible.

Nor was this all. Effective ambushers must never attack the head of a column, nor hold their fire until the column has passed—either way, some of the enemy column may escape. But to open fire on the middle of the column insures that the ambushes can neither advance nor retreat, but must stand and fight and be annihilated. It

was this effect that President Johnson's order unwittingly achieved.

In order to see why this was so, it is only necessary to consider what would have happened if the President had committed American combat troops in Vietnam rather more than a year earlier when the Pentagon first urged him to do so. In that spring of 1964, the harshest and most burdensome period of the second government's main-force program still lay in the future, and the Viet Cong had barely begun to drop their masks. It would still not have been too late for a convincing reassertion of the Viet Cong mask of agrarian reformers, with no need for heavy taxes or press-ganged conscripts. The V.C. could therefore have pulled back and dug in for many more years of less intensive war, on the classical, slowly erosive, elusive guerrilla pattern that they understand so well. There can be no doubt that this is precisely what the Viet Cong would have done if the President had in fact committed U.S. troops a year earlier. The rule books are very strict about this: Mao Tse-tung strongly emphasizes the need for any guerrilla movement to be ready to retreat at once if the conditions of the struggle unexpectedly develop in an unfavorable manner.

But the Viet Cong could not follow this pull-back rule when Johnson at last committed U.S. troops, because the V.C. had already breached Mao Tse-tung's cardinal rule against alienating popular support before the final victory. It is not easy, after all, for any government, legal or clandestine, to pull back and to ask its people to fight onward indefinitely, if the most sacred promises have been broken, and if this has been justified by assertions that the war will end in triumph in a few weeks or months. It is very dangerous, too, for any guerrilla movement to dilute its fighting units with unwilling conscripts, as the Viet Cong had done. In the early summer of 1965, this danger was demonstrated by a first trickle of Viet Cong desertions, previously all but unheard of—a trickle that has now become a near hemorrhage in some units and some areas of Vietnam. Above all, there was the danger in the countryside, where heavy taxes and press-gang conscription had caused the people's former propagandized consent to be widely replaced by sullen acquiescence. This danger was also being demonstrated by the tens of thousands who were refusing to acquiesce. And these people, fleeing from "liberated areas" to government areas, have now become a pitiful refugee army of nearly a million men, women and children. Their flight has even begun to leave the V.C. areas seriously short of hands to till the crops. For these reasons, it was much too risky to pull back, and the second government made its defiant choice to continue the war in the main-force phase.

The same basic considerations that led the Hanoi and V.C. leaders to make this choice also led Gen. Westmoreland to adopt his strategy of "seeking out and destroying" the Viet Cong main forces. When the President's troop commitment abruptly gave Westmoreland the responsibility for turning the tide and winning the war, this careful yet inspired soldier had been studying the Viet Cong for many anxious months. Obviously the V.C. and North Vietnamese main-force regiments, being heavier outfits that could be located and engaged with greater ease, were the most suitable military targets for the incoming American troops. Gen. Westmoreland's chief reasons, nevertheless, for concentrating on the main forces were—and are—paramilitary. Westmoreland reasoned that the Viet Cong had made themselves politically vulnerable by breaking the first rule of Mao Tse-tung, and that this vulnerability would increase as war pressures forced the V.C. to take more rice and more conscripts from the long-suffering villagers. He believed, therefore, that the already severe

strains on the V.C. second government could be increased until its entire structure would crumble. And he planned to precipitate this general breakup of the second government's structure by breaking the main-force backbone of the V.C. Time alone can tell whether Westmoreland is right, but he most certainly still believes he will be proved right—if the accidents of Saigon politics do not tragically forestall the proof.

We have now examined two of the three main parts of the war's military pattern—the gamble taken by the V.C. second government to create its main forces and the ambush effect of President Johnson's troop commitment. If the Viet Cong had not gambled by breaking Mao's first rule on popular support and if they now had a less burdensome and more flexible military organization, I should be making a very different military prognosis.

But these conditions do not now exist in Vietnam, because the rules have in fact been broken. And more rule breaking is the essence of the third part of the war's military pattern which is the acuteness of the combat problems now besetting the V.C. For the Viet Cong leaders, beyond doubt, this is the pattern's most painful part, since their entire experience has taught them to put an almost religious reliance on the simple fighting rules laid down by Giap and Mao. These tactical rules worked brilliantly well for Mao in China, and for Giap against the French and for the Viet Cong themselves until last year. They built the record, in fact, that still leads people to repeat solemnly that "regular troops cannot defeat guerrillas." Yet these closely studied, carefully defined tactical rules for guerrilla war have all but begun to work in reverse in Vietnam nowadays. This is the most far-reaching single result of the U.S. troop commitment.

Consider, for example, "old never-fail." In the years before 1965, "old never-fail" was the sardonic name used by American officers advising the South Vietnamese army for the guerrillas' surprise-attack-plus-ambush combination. This combination was the principal offensive tactic of the Viet Cong, accounting for over 80 percent of their more showy and damaging victories during all the years when the war was going well for them. First would come the pre-dawn news that mortar shells were falling on an isolated government post, which was surrounded by a strong V.C. force that had crept up under cover of darkness. The government's province chief (the military governor) would hastily organize a relieving force, and the column of troops would move out, as dawn began to break, along the wretched, narrow road leading to the post under attack. Then would come the report that the relief column had been ambushed by another strong V.C. force which had slipped into positions commanding the road's most dangerous sector. Next the radio would fall ominously silent, meaning, of course, that the post under attack had also fallen. And so the government's forces would be further eroded and demoralized, government control would be reduced, and V.C. power and authority would once again grow proportionally.

But "old never-fail" began to work very differently with the end of the rather primitive situation envisioned by Mao and Giap—a situation in which the government had few heavy guns, only the barest minimum of air power, and no air-mobile infantry. This situation ceased to exist in South Vietnam last year. First, a network of heavy-artillery positions was thrown over most of the country, and these were linked by good communications to every government post in the populated areas, and to most of the more remote posts as well. Second, after Pleiku the President not only ordered bombing of the North, he also authorized direct use of American air power in the South, thereby multiplying the air strength the Viet Cong had to face. And finally, the

American troop commitment vastly multiplied the helicopters available for troop lifts.

Today when the Viet Cong attempt "old never-fail," as they still frequently do, the ambushers generally discover that they are really ambushes. The post chosen for surprise attack at once calls in the heavy artillery, and the big guns inevitably slow down the assault. When dawn breaks, U.S. fighters and fighter-bombers make their appearance, guided by spotter planes, and unless the Viet Cong break off the attack, they become exposed targets for decimation from the air. If the situation warrants, there may also be a hell-lift of infantry, either to cut off the V.C. surrounding the post, or to take the V.C. ambushing force in the rear.

"Old never-fail" has certainly not become "old always-fail." Nor have their novel tactical handicaps taken all the fight out of the Viet Cong, any more than their widespread loss of popular support has deprived them of the active help of the 10 to 15 percent of genuine Communist converts in their "liberated areas." Only recently they were able to bring up two artillery batteries for an attack on the very outskirts of Saigon—which did not succeed, but did cause much disquiet in the city. And terroristic acts continue in most provinces at a very high rate.

Yet it is deeply meaningful that in the months from last September—when the U.S. troop commitment began to have a serious impact—until late April, when these words were written, the record shows only two victorious V.C. operations much above the petty-terror level. These were the annihilation of a South Vietnamese regiment in a Michelin rubber plantation early last winter and the more recent capture of the isolated Special Forces post at Ashau on the Laotian border. By contrast, the Viet Cong failures have been too numerous to be recalled. These failures have vastly greater meaning, moreover, than might be surmised from newspaper stories of body counts of 50 enemy dead here, 100 in another place, and in another place above 200, after a Viet Cong or North Vietnamese assault has been beaten back. These stories mean that the V.C. are now regularly breaking the next-most-important guerrilla rule after the rule about always retaining popular support.

As Mayo and Giap both emphasize, any guerrilla movement lives and grows and has its being by success. Great failures may perhaps be precariously survived, as happened in China at the time of the famous Long March. The rule books nonetheless enjoin guerrilla commanders always to prefer the mere assassination of a village elder to the dramatic capture of a district town, if it is thought that the attempt on the town may risk defeat. Yet the Viet Cong have been floundering forward with great obstinacy and considerable courage, from failure to bloody failure for many months, with few military successes.

These changes in the tactical situation have quite directly affected every type of Viet Cong unit, whether main-force, local-force or guerrilla—for the guerrilla bands are almost always ordered to support the larger operations in their neighborhoods. The main forces—Gen. Westmoreland's prime targets—are the units chiefly affected by another change of great significance. Life in a main-force regiment once offered a good deal to tempt an ambitious young Vietnamese. He belonged to a crack unit, which was a matter of pride. He had been taught to believe in an early victory, and as a main-force soldier he could expect personal advancement when victory was won. Above all, he did not have to endure prolonged hardship. Two or three night marches out from the base, one or two days of fighting at the scene of his regiment's operation, and two or three night marches back to his regimental main-base area—that was about the

maximum effort that was normally required each month. The balance of every month was spent resting, training, absorbing replacements and doing meticulous sand-table exercises to prepare the next sally against a government post. And all these weeks between operations were passed in the absolute security of a main base, with its simple but comfortable barracks, its reassuring fortifications, and its food caches.

Today, however, this quite bearable existence has suffered a savage transformation. It began when Gen. Westmoreland called in the B-52's of the Strategic Air Command, with their immense loads of heavy bombs that can penetrate even fortification tunnels 30 feet below ground. Daily since late last summer, the B-52's have been hammering the main-base areas, with such effect, as captured documents have revealed, that the main-force regiments are now under strict orders to spend no more than one night, or at most two nights, in the same place. Long gone, therefore, are each month's restorative stretches of orderly barracks life.

Night after night, the main-force soldiers must bivouac in the jungle or on the mountain slopes. Every day or every two days there is a toilsome march to the next bivouac. These movements cause supply problems, and the men sometimes go hungry. There's little time for rest or training, or any of the other things that keep an outfit happy and in combat trim. In addition, as the American forces in Vietnam have grown stronger, there have been more infantry sweeps through the main-base areas—many of which had not been visited by hostile troops since the beginning of the French war. Supply caches that took months, even years, to accumulate are found and destroyed by our men. Fortifications representing hundreds of thousands, even millions, of man-hours of hard work are discovered and greatly damaged, if not always totally destroyed. V.C. outfits that have sought the base areas' security must either flee or stand and fight against hard odds. In these ways still another cardinal Mao-Giap rule has been broken—the rule that a successful guerrilla movement needs completely secure bases. Without this minimal security, Mao says, any such movement must automatically "deteriorate" into a mere "peasant revolt" which "it would be fanciful to suppose" could "avoid defeat."

From the foregoing follows the final profound change in the V.C. situation. In Vietnam the intelligence gathered has always been substantial, but the South Vietnamese formerly had no way to process intelligence as it came in, much less to respond to it promptly. Nowadays, in contrast, the intelligence gathered has multiplied many times over, partly by freer reporting by the people of the countryside, partly by mechanical means such as airborne infrared devices that spot main-force campfires and the like, and partly by the enormously increased numbers of deserters and prisoners of war. Furthermore Gen. Westmoreland's headquarters has now set up something like a Vietnamese-American intelligence-processing factory, capable of handling several tons of captured documents and several hundreds of interrogations in a single week. Thus it is no longer a case of blind men fighting men who see all too well, as it was for so many years.

The new eyes of the intelligence can even penetrate main-base areas well enough so that each B-52 strike has proved to have an even chance of finding its pinpoint target of barracks and fortifications within the huge surrounding tract of swamp or jungle or mountain forest. Movements of Viet Cong units are also being swiftly tracked if luck is good and the movements are fairly big. Sometimes we have no luck, as with the recent attack near Saigon. Yet good intelligence enabled Gen. Westmoreland to mount

no fewer than eight uniformly successful spoiling operations against long-planned V.C. attacks in a recent period of only a few weeks. Thus another crucial rule is being broken pretty frequently, for both Mao and Giap lay great emphasis on all guerrillas' need to move absolutely unseen, while watching the smallest enemy movement. Inasmuch as such texts as Mao Tse-tung's *On the Protracted War* and Vo Nguyen Giap's *People's War, People's Army* have always had the standing of scripture for both the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, the Mao-Giap prescriptions' rather monotonous failure to work nowadays must be a very shaking thing in itself. The Viet Cong soldiers must be greatly shaken too by the failure of their leaders to find substitute prescriptions that work a bit better. Nowadays a Viet Cong battalion commander getting his orders for another surprise-attack-plus-ambush must have the same sinking feeling that the government's province chiefs always used to have when word came in of another pre-dawn assault on an isolated post. For the long pull, an unending diet of many big and little defeats, with only the rarest success to raise the spirits, can in itself prove fatal to the Viet Cong. *The strain of declining morale is already grave, as prisoner interrogations reveal, and this strain is bound to increase if Gen. Westmoreland is allowed to pursue his strategy.*

These are the principal factors that control the present pattern of the fighting in Vietnam. *I would be less confident of their great significance if I had not closely watched the trend of the fighting.* When I visited Vietnam in the spring of 1965, one could easily discern American air power's effects on the Viet Cong. But it was equally easy to see that air power alone was not enough, and that the V.C. would win during the summer if the President did not commit U.S. ground troops.

When I visited Vietnam again last September, the full impact of the initial U.S. troop commitment was really beginning to be felt. The fine Marine victory at Chuoi had taught the Viet Cong that Americans were not "paper tigers" after all—at any rate, not on the field of battle. The first B-52 raids on the main bases were beginning to show impressive results. It was already clear that the tide had turned, but it was by no means clear as yet how the Viet Cong and their masters in Hanoi would deal with this alarming change.

On the key point there was some divergence between Gen. Westmoreland and the majority of his staff. Westmoreland already suspected that the President had achieved an unintended ambush, and he therefore doubted whether the Viet Cong were free to follow Mao's rules of "advance and retreat." His staff members were almost unanimous in expecting the Viet Cong to follow the rules. This was a disturbing prospect, for a return to classical guerrilla fighting was bound to mean American troops endlessly marching through jungle and over mountains in frequently vain pursuit of mere companies of the enemy. Westmoreland's staff asked "whether the people at home would stand for an endless penny-packet war." If there was any way at all to exhaust American patience and fortitude, endless penny-packet war was surely the most likely way.

These worries were shown to be ill-founded in October, in the obstinate battle for the Pleime Special Forces post, and in the subsequent fighting in the Ia Drang valley, which continued into early November. For days on end, with superb courage and endurance, a small band of men of the Special Forces, both American and Vietnamese, took on and hurled back a greatly superior number of troops of the V.C. main forces. When the Pleime outpost had been relieved at last, the

scene shifted to the Ia Drang Valley. Here the men of the 1st Air Cavalry engaged an entire North Vietnamese division, composed of the 32nd regiment, the 33rd regiment, and the 66th regiment, with two V.C. main-force regiments in occasional support. Even by mid-October the number of American combat troops on the ground was not large, and Maj. Gen. Harry Kinnard, commander of the 1st Air Cavalry, could not afford to overcommit his vital division. Hence he never put into the line more than two battalions-plus, the battalions in combat being rotated by helicopter as the fighting went on. On our side, therefore, we did not have as much as a full regiment engaged at any one time, whereas the enemy had three regiments always engaged, with two more to aid them.

As must happen, alas, in battle, 275 men of the Air Cavalry were killed in the weeks the action lasted. But we have since captured the enemy's complete battle plans, and we also have a post-battle critique by the North Vietnamese commander on the scene, who has the pseudonym of Gen. Bai Quan. This evidence reveals that in this single battle the enemy lost the staggering total of 5,000 killed and severely wounded, as well as almost all his heavy weapons. By any test this victory against such odds was a shining feat of U. S. arms, all the more noteworthy because these were near-green American troops.

After the Ia Drang valley no one could any longer believe in an intended Viet Cong pull-back to low-level guerrilla activity. If the V.C. could not or would not pull back, it was clear that they would have to try to go forward. Furthermore, there was increasing evidence of a massive, continuing invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese regulars coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Reconnaissance also revealed that the North Vietnamese were urgently improving the trail to make it a truckable highway.

In November, therefore, Hanoi's apparent intention to reinforce the Viet Cong to the utmost led Gen. Westmoreland's staff to make carefully revised estimates of the enemy's maximum capabilities—the maximum military buildup the North Vietnamese government and the V.C. second government could achieve and support. These estimates projected a continuous growth of the enemy main forces in South Vietnam at the rate of two regiments per month until the end of 1966. In other words, the main forces, which had a strength equivalent to 10 divisions when the President committed U.S. troops, were projected to grow to a strength equivalent to about 18 divisions before next New Year's Day.

This projection by Gen. Westmoreland's staff was presented to Secretary of Defense McNamara when he visited Saigon at the end of November. It of course implied a need for a good many more American troops to match the enemy's expected increase of strength. For this reason the new estimates caused a panic in Washington when Secretary McNamara brought them home. Out of the panic grew the President's peace offensive, the pause in the bombing of the North, and other manifestations that presumably helped to renew the Hanoi leaders' slumping faith in their basic theory of American weakness of will. The question remains whether the panic was justified. I think it was wholly unjustified.

My chief reason is based on the situation I discovered when I returned to Vietnam for my most recent visit in February. On the one hand, all was far from perfection on our side. The stability of the South Vietnamese government could certainly not be taken for granted. And the President's hesitant and intricate methods of war-making, combined with the manifestoes of the war's senatorial and other critics, had de-



prived our men of the absolute confidence in their support at home that American troops in combat always ought ideally to have. On the other hand, however, these imperfections, though serious enough, were powerfully counterbalanced by the situation of the Viet Cong.

The refugee flow from the V.C. areas was increasing; by the end of February the total was nearing 800,000 men, women and children, or close to one sixth of the population that the V.C. had controlled at their high point. Viet Cong propaganda was already publicly denouncing the refugee movement as an imperialist plot to diminish the rice supplies available to the second government's tax collectors. There were symptoms that the V.C. second government's available pool of conscripts had already begun to dry up in more than one province. In Gen. Westmoreland's highly successful Masher-White Wing operation, the two prime-target regiments, the 18th of the North Vietnamese 325th division and the 2nd V.C. main-force regiment, had come south into Binh Dinh province with the primary intention of taking the offensive—instead they were so badly knocked about that they were put out of action for several months. But P.O.W. interrogations revealed that these regiments' southward move from Quangnai province had the secondary purpose of securing badly needed replacements, since the press gangs had been coming back almost empty-handed.

When I went down to the delta town of My Tho, I discovered the sad plight of the most famous V.C. provincial battalion in Vietnam, called by Hanoi radio the "Ever Victorious Ap Bac Battalion" in memory of a smashing success in the past. The "Ever Victorious" had just suffered two drubbings within two months by the local South Vietnamese troops. Furthermore—and much more revealing—the battalion was now afflicted, according to a large number of defectors, with a desertion rate well above 60 percent per year. Each province in Vietnam is markedly different from the next province, and symptoms in Quangnai and in Dinh Tong, the stamping ground of the "Ever Victorious," must never be exaggerated into nationwide symptoms, yet all this evidence was pretty impressive nonetheless.

The provincial evidence and the immense refugee movement were impressive, above all, because they had no precedents. Even more impressive, and equally unprecedented, was the evidence of the many battlefields. Until hardly more than a year ago, just one Viet Cong prisoner of war or battlefield deserter was so rare a phenomenon that Saigon would be agog about him for days on end, and it was also a real cause for celebration if as many as four or five enemy dead were found on the field of battle. Even today the V.C. and North Vietnamese have not altered the battlefield discipline that requires all killed and wounded to be carried away by their comrades, any more than they have changed their rules against desertion. After the Chuoi fight, a couple of hundred Viet Cong corpses were found hidden in a trench where they had been dragged with butchers' meat hooks. More recently, V.C. P.O.W.'s have turned up with tops attached to their clothing to make dragging easier in case of need—a prebattle precaution which must surely raise fighting spirit in a wonderful manner. Thus while others might be unimpressed, I, remembering the quite recent past, was left all but incredulous by the almost daily body counts of enemy dead abandoned on the battlefield, and by the constant news of prisoners of war and battlefield deserters.

It is also worth noting that in the two months of January and February, the body counts reached a grisly cumulative total of 7,352 enemy dead. This means that the true total of enemy killed in action was certainly above 10,000, for although counts made in

combat must be discounted for accidental duplication, a big addition must also be made for enemy dead dragged away in continuing compliance with the old discipline. It is also conservative to assume that the total of the enemy's disabblingly wounded was double the total of those killed. Hence the overall figure for enemy dead and disabled in January and February alone was probably above 30,000. To this must be added 1,100 P.O.W.'s and battlefield deserters—the latter being troops who seize the opportunity of battle to squat down in a ditch until they are overrun by our men. To be sure, not more than half these heavy V.C. losses were soldiers of the main forces, for many were porters, guerrillas, local-force troops and even civilians impressed as temporary porters. But even so, it was abundantly clear that the main forces were being very badly knocked about. This was all the more striking because the *la Drang experience* had taught the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese commanders not to court any more set-piece battles. Engaging main forces had therefore become more difficult, since they in most cases had first to be sought out. Altogether the "seek out and destroy" strategy struck me as succeeding beyond all expectations. What is more important, this opinion was—and is—shared by Gen. Westmoreland.

If you look at this war's military aspect without regard to such political factors as instability in Saigon, or hesitancy in Washington to give full backing to Gen. Westmoreland, you have to conclude that the situation is full of promise. To be sure, the enemy is still reinforcing at about the rate projected in the November estimates. To be sure, the very fact that the enemy is still reinforcing means that clearly he intends to use his reinforcements in battle. So there is hard fighting still ahead. But if you make a practical analysis of the V.C. second government's problems you are driven to conclude that the present enemy reinforcement is like one of those last high raises that losing players sometimes make to frighten their opponents out of a poker game.

The limit on the number of troops the North Vietnamese Communists can send southward is not yet in sight, but the limit is quite clearly in sight on the number of troop units the V.C. second government can sustain in the South. This is why it is wrong to talk about an "unlimited war," and this is also the main reason for believing that we are confronted with something like a desperate last high raise in poker. If you examine the projection of enemy-troop buildup made by Gen. Westmoreland's staff, you find, first of all, that most of the buildup is accounted for by a very large additional invasion of the South by North Vietnamese. This is risky in itself, since many of the southern rank and file of the Viet Cong much resent the overt northern takeover in the South. Second, you find a very puzzling anomaly, in the form of a great increase in the burden of the already overburdened V.C. second government. In the spring of 1965 the strain of supporting main forces of a strength of 10 divisions was already severe. If the enemy buildup continues until the end of this year as projected by the Westmoreland staff, the strain will be nearly twice as great, for the V.C. second government will be supporting main forces of the strength of 18 divisions. All the strictly military personnel of the main forces are now coming from North Vietnam—but this was already the case in 1965. But now, on the one hand, the V.C. second government has a reduced productive and manpower base, primarily because of the refugee movement. And on the other hand, if the buildup continues as projected, the second government is eventually going to have to provide the main forces with nearly twice as much rice each month, with at least double the number of men to fill gaps in the

regimental ranks, and with close to double the number of men or women (for women are now being drafted for this purpose) to serve in the porter battalions and the longer range transport detachments. If the strain was already severe in the spring of 1965, what then will be the strain on the V.C. second government by December, 1966?

The answer, I think, is that the present enemy reinforcement has behind it a truly desperate decision—a decision, in fact to throw in all remaining reserves, and to consume all the remaining stocks of food and other supplies still cached in the main bases, to make one final try for victory. If this be true, we are indeed confronted with a last high raise. And the maker of a last high raise always loses the game if another player has the resources and the courage to call and raise again.

I believe that we in America have the needed courage, as I know we have the needed resources. To this hopeful observation, however, I must add two brief footnotes. First, a warning is needed concerning that phrase "losing the game." When and if Gen. Westmoreland succeeds in breaking the enemy's main forces, the big war in Vietnam will be over, and the game will really be won. Breaking the main forces will break most of the V.C. power in the countryside. It will not break all the V.C. power, however. A little war of mopping-up operations, costing few casualties and needing fewer troops, but troublesome and ugly all the same, may therefore continue for a considerable period. By method and determination, that little war can be won in the end in South Vietnam. But the war planners in Hanoi will still be the masters of the V.C. remnants of the South. They will still have the power to end all fighting by calling home their men. And the prime reason for maintaining a stern, persistent, though not irrational, bombing pressure on North Vietnam is to teach the lesson that the call-home order had better be given as soon as the big war in the South is decisively lost.

Second, despite the hopefulness of the military situation, the war can perhaps be lost somewhere in the dark labyrinths of Saigon politics. Despite all the positive factors, this warning must be reiterated, and the need for American patience with the vagaries of Vietnamese politics must be emphasized. For close on a century before 1954, the Vietnamese had no experience of self-government. Under Ngo Dinh Diem, they then made considerable progress. As authoritarian governments go, the Diem regime was worthy of considerable respect—far more respect, certainly, than the dogmatic, harsh and gloomy Communist regime in the North—but under Diem, the Vietnamese got their bellyful of authoritarian government in Saigon. A long period of sometimes wild cut-and-try is therefore unavoidable, before the Vietnamese find the mode of government that suits their traditions, habits and outlook. There is nothing to worry about in that—so long as they do not stab themselves in the back during one of the wilder cut-and-tries. For the long pull, moreover, South Vietnam is one of the very richest countries in Asia, with an industrious and talented people who have been forcefully dragged into the 20th century by all the technological lessons of their bitter war experience. So I have no patience with those who ask, "What shall we have in South Vietnam, even if we win?" Every sort of basic factor promises a good future, if the suffering people of South Vietnam can only be granted peace at last. If that time comes, moreover, the United States can not only take the satisfaction of a stronger nation that has rendered loyal service to a weaker ally, we in our country can also sleep more easily in our own beds. For if the northern Communist aggression against South Vietnam is not successfully defeated, there will be another such

aggression, and another, and another, until men begin to say, "The line must be drawn somewhere." And thus the Third World War may begin, and that is what we are now fighting to avert.

#### LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. Boggs), for Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, May 31, June 1 and June 2, on account of official business.

Mr. HANNA (at the request of Mr. Boggs), for today and tomorrow, on account of official business.

#### SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to Mr. CAHILL (at the request of Mr. HORTON), for 10 minutes, today; to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. ROSENTHAL, notwithstanding the cost is estimated by the Public Printer to be \$234.

Mr. HALL and to include extraneous material.

Mr. MATSUNAGA in three instances.

Mr. WATTS (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) to extend his remarks during debate on title II in the Committee of the Whole today.

Mr. FARBSTAIN (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) to revise and extend his remarks during debate on the Powell amendment in the Committee of the Whole today, and to include extraneous matter and tables.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HORTON) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. QUILLIN in two instances.

Mr. LIPSCOMB.

Mr. DOLE.

Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska.

Mr. YOUNGER.

Mr. RUMSFELD in two instances.

Mr. AYRES.

Mr. ELLSWORTH in two instances.

Mr. DERWINSKI.

Mr. BRAY in two instances.

Mr. SAYLOR.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM in five instances.

Mr. REID of New York.

Mr. MORSE in three instances.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania in five instances.

Mr. REINECKE in five instances.

Mr. SKUBITZ in two instances.

Mr. ASHBROOK.

Mr. KUPFERMAN in five instances.

Mr. MATHIAS in 10 instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. KARTH.

Mr. ANNUNZIO.

Mr. BOLLING in two instances.

Mr. HANSEN of Iowa in two instances.

Mr. FULTON of Tennessee.

Mr. JACOBS in two instances.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina.

Mr. GONZALEZ in two instances.

Mr. MOORHEAD in six instances.

Mrs. KELLY.

Mr. SWEENEY.

Mr. RYAN in three instances.

Mr. DULSKI.

Mr. COOLEY in two instances.

Mr. GARMATZ.

Mr. MONAGAN.

Mr. RANDALL.

#### ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 21 minutes p.m.) the House adjourned until tomorrow, Friday, May 27, 1966, at 12 o'clock noon.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

2433. A communication from the President of the United States transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to revise the Federal election laws, and for other purposes (H. Doc. No. 444); to the Committee on House Administration, and ordered to be printed.

2434. A communication from the President of the United States transmitting amendments to the request for appropriations for the legislative branch for fiscal year 1967 (H. Doc. No. 445); to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

2435. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report of compilation of General Accounting Office findings and recommendations for improving Government operations, fiscal year 1965 (H. Doc. No. 446); to the Committee on Government Operations, and ordered to be printed.

2436. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) transmitting a report on Department of Defense procurement from small and other business firms for July 1965-March 1966, pursuant to the provisions of section 10(d) of the Small Business Act, as amended; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

2437. A letter from Congressmen DANTE B. FASCELL, DONALD M. FRASER, JOSEPH Y. RESNICK, ALBERT QUIE, JAMES D. MARTIN, HOWARD W. ROBISON, Representatives to Conference on International Cooperation, transmitting a report on the participation during 1965 of the United States in the activities of the International Cooperation Year (ICY); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

2438. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report of review of efforts to have borrowers refinance their Government loans when private or cooperative credit becomes available, Farmers Home Administration, Department of Agriculture; to the Committee on Government Operations.

2439. A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to provide for the establishment of the Wolf Trap Farm Park in Fairfax County, Va., and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

2440. A letter from the President, Board of Commissioners, District of Columbia, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to establish, or cooperate in the establishment of, a laboratory for the testing

of materials, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. FRIEDEL: Committee on House Administration. House Resolution 855. Resolution providing for an additional clerk for all House Members; with amendment (Rept. No. 1556). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. KEOGH: Committee on Ways and Means. H.R. 10. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to permit pension and profit-sharing plans to provide contributions or benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis for certain self-employed individuals without special limitations on the amount of contributions; with amendment (Rept. No. 1557). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

#### PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. AYRES:

H.R. 15299. A bill to amend the veterans' educational assistance program in title 38 of the United States Code to provide for payments to certain veterans who obtained their education before June 1, 1966; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. BLATNIK:

H.R. 15300. A bill to assist in the promotion of economic stabilization by requiring the disclosure of finance charges in connection with extensions of credit; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

H.R. 15301. A bill to protect children and others from accidental death or injury by amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to aspirin intended for children, safety closures on drug containers, and cautionary labeling of containers of articles subject to the act where necessary to that end, and by amending the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act to ban hazardous toys and articles intended for children, and other articles so hazardous as to be dangerous in the household regardless of labeling, and to apply to unpackaged articles intended for household use, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H.R. 15302. A bill to provide that tires sold or shipped in interstate commerce for use on motor vehicles shall meet certain safety standards; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN:

H.R. 15303. A bill to prohibit desecration of the flag; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. EDWARDS of California:

H.R. 15304. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to sell the Pleasanton Plant Materials Center in Alameda County, Calif., and to provide for the establishment of a plant materials center at a more suitable location to replace the Pleasanton Plant Materials Center, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. GROVER:

H.R. 15305. A bill to establish a U.S. Department of Maritime Affairs; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. IRWIN:

H.R. 15306. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to provide that members of the Armed Forces shall be retired in the highest grade satisfactorily held in any armed force, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. JACOBS:

H.R. 15307. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, to authorize and facilitate the deduction from gross income by teachers of the expenses of education (including certain travel) undertaken by them, and to provide a uniform method of proving entitlement to such deduction; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. LEGGETT:

H.R. 15308. A bill to authorize a separate sleeve insignia for Merrill's Marauders, a volunteer unit of the U.S. Army that served in the China-Burma-India theater of operations during World War II; to the Committee on Armed Services.

H.R. 15309. A bill to amend title III of the National Housing Act, to increase the funds available to the Federal National Mortgage Association for its secondary market operations; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. McVICKER:

H.R. 15310. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize the award of exemplary rehabilitation certificates to certain individuals after considering their character and conduct in civilian life after discharge or dismissal from the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. MILLS:

H.R. 15311. A bill to amend the Social Security Act to provide for expansion and development of social work manpower training; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. REES:

H.R. 15312. A bill to provide for the establishment of the Joseph H. Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. SISK:

H.R. 15313. A bill to amend title 32, United States Code, to clarify the status of National Guard technicians, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. WHITTEN:

H.R. 15314. A bill to authorize an additional 41,000 miles for the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. WYDLER:

H.R. 15315. A bill to amend title 39, United States Code, to change the positions of city or special carrier and special delivery messenger (KP-11), distribution clerk (KP-12), and window clerk (KP-13) from salary level 4 to salary level 5 of the Postal Field Service Schedule; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. ASPINALL (by request):

H.R. 15316. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to enter into contracts for scientific and technological research, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BURLINSON:

H.R. 15317. A bill to revise the Federal election laws; and for other purposes; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. CURTIS:

H.R. 15318. A bill to amend title 18 of the United States Code to protect the constitutional rights of mentally incompetent persons committed thereunder, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DULSKI:

H.R. 15319. A bill to authorize the Postmaster General to relieve postmasters and other employees for certain losses resulting from improper, or incorrect payments; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. EDWARDS of Louisiana:

H.R. 15320. A bill to amend the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 to prohibit entrance, admission, and user fees at fish and wildlife refuges and similar areas;

to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. GAERMATZ:

H.R. 15321. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to establish the Constellation National Historic Site, in the State of Maryland, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. HALPERN:

H.R. 15322. A bill to provide for the establishment of a permanent commission on aircraft noise abatement problems, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HARVEY of Michigan:

H.R. 15323. A bill to enlarge the home mortgage purchase authority which the Federal National Mortgage Association may exercise in its secondary market operations by increasing the amount of preferred stock which such association may issue for delivery to the Secretary of the Treasury; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. HELSTOSKI:

H.R. 15324. A bill to amend the National Defense Education Act of 1958 to permit Federal grants for equipment for the teaching of, and for institutes for teachers of, music and art; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 15325. A bill to amend the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, as amended, to provide for special programs for older workers; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 15326. A bill to amend Public Law 815, 81st Congress, to provide temporary assistance where public school buildings are destroyed by natural causes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 15327. A bill to amend title 18 of the United States Code to prohibit the use of contributions made to Members of Congress for personal purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mrs. KELLY:

H.R. 15328. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act to provide equality of treatment with respect to the survivor annuants of male and female employees, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. MATHIAS:

H.R. 15329. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to establish the Constellation National Historic Site, in the State of Maryland, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. MILLS:

H.R. 15330. A bill relating to the income tax treatment of installment sales when a taxpayer changes from the accrual to the installment basis of reporting profits; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ROBISON:

H.R. 15331. A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to extend and enlarge the program of grants for educational television broadcasting facilities; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. SWEENEY:

H.R. 15332. A bill to establish a free guide service for the U.S. Capitol Building; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. TODD:

H.R. 15333. A bill to provide that expenditures made in connection with certain structures and facilities in the city of Albion, Mich., may be counted as local grants-in-aid toward an urban renewal project in accordance with title I of the Housing Act of 1949; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. WHALLEY:

H.R. 15334. A bill to amend title 39, United States Code, with respect to mailing privileges of members of the U.S. Armed Forces and other Federal Government personnel

overseas, to extend such mailing privileges to voice recordings of personal messages, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. FOUNTAIN:

H.R. 15335. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to establish an Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations," approved September 24, 1959; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mrs. DWYER:

H.R. 15336. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to establish an Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations," approved September 24, 1959; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. BATES:

H.J. Res. 1149. Joint resolution to authorize the President to proclaim National Ceramic Hobby Day; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HELSTOSKI:

H.J. Res. 1150. Joint resolution to authorize the President of the United States to proclaim August 28, 1966, as Polish Millennium Day; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KING of California:

H.J. Res. 1151. Joint resolution to request the President to negotiate with the Mexican Government for the purpose of setting up a Joint United States-Mexican Commission to investigate the flow of marijuana, narcotic drugs, and dangerous drugs between the United States and Mexico; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. RONCALIO:

H.J. Res. 1152. Joint resolution expressing the intent of the Congress with respect to appropriations for watershed planning for fiscal year 1966; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. MILLS:

H. Res. 872. Resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of Public Law 89-97, 89th Congress, the "Social Security Amendments of 1965"; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. RESNICK:

H. Res. 873. Resolution, Father's Day; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

## MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII,

481. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the Legislature of the State of Maryland relative to the appropriation of funds necessary for the construction of a water impounding dam on the North Fork of the Potomac River on the Maryland-West Virginia border; to the Committee on Appropriations.

## PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BELL:

H.R. 15337. A bill for the relief of Leonard Alfred Brownrigg; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CALLAN:

H.R. 15338. A bill for relief of Peony Park, Inc., and others; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mrs. GREEN of Oregon:

H.R. 15339. A bill for the relief of Dr. Roman Bijan, his wife, Helena Bijan, and their minor daughters Kristina Bijan and Maria Bijan; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. REES:

H.R. 15340. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Lucille Colucci and her minor son, Richard Colucci; to the Committee on the Judiciary.



May 26, 1966

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the Federal program for community mental health centers. While I understand that a plan for centers is in process and will probably be submitted within the month, I cannot understand why Rhode Island was not in the forefront of this national movement.

Look at the States whose centers plans have already been approved—New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Florida, Ohio, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Louisiana, Colorado, California, Washington, South Carolina and Oregon. Why should not Rhode Island be at or near the head of the list?

As I have said the urgency and the pressing need were so great in the United States that comprehensive planning and centers planning were called for at the same time. But this has not occurred in Rhode Island; and not only that, neither planning process in our State has kept to the projected timetable.

As an example, our State was allotted \$50,000 in matching funds for the first full year of comprehensive planning, but the planning process was slow in getting underway and more than \$31,000 of the \$50,000 had to be returned to the Federal Government unexpended.

We are in danger of having the same thing happen to the funds that have been appropriated for the construction of mental health centers. A total of \$35 million was appropriated for use nationally during fiscal 1965—but, knowing that such programs take time to develop, the Congress made the funds available for a period of two consecutive years.

Rhode Island's allocated 1965 share was \$156,014 and our matching percentage is approximately 50 percent. Thus, to build a comprehensive community mental health center in Rhode Island, the State and community would need provide only half the cost.

But the process does take time; an application for funds cannot be developed overnight. We have only a little more than six months now until the first funds will be lost to us. A year and a half has passed since this money first became available. Why have we not succeeded in using it?

The construction program as authorized in the Centers Act is to cover three years and, just as for the first year, each year's funds will be available for two years. Already the 1966 funds have been appropriated and our allocated share is \$225,920.

But specific recommendations regarding sources, methods and levels of financing a mental health program to take advantage of our opportunities in this area are lacking altogether in the Rhode Island comprehensive plan. These must be provided—and soon—by the responsible State officials.

The plan does recommend the development of a model mental health law for Rhode Island to be submitted to the general assembly at its 1966 session. This, too, must be done: Rhode Island cannot continue to lag behind the 25 other States that have already enacted such legislation.

The Governor's council on mental health has recommended an extensive program for expanding mental health facilities in Rhode Island. The council's report also called for the establishment of several new institutions.

According to the council, an estimated 86,000 persons in the State were in need of some form of psychiatric care in 1960, and the council's prediction was that the number could increase to 94,200 by 1970. Last year, approximately 82,800 persons were treated in Rhode Island.

Although the council has not estimated specifically the cost of such an expanded program, it did say that a great deal of money would be involved. But a great deal of money is available to us, if we will only use it. The Government has told us it is ready

and willing to match our funds—dollar for dollar in the construction of mental health centers—and it asks only a guarantee in the form of a viable State plan in return for this money.

To be eligible for these funds, as most of you know, a center must offer at least what are called the five essential mental health services: inpatient treatment, outpatient treatment, partial hospitalization, emergency services and consultation and education services. These criteria for centers are far from unreasonable—an emotionally disturbed person should be able to expect to find such services available to him, and close to his home.

Further, amendments to the Centers Act that were enacted this year to provide staffing assistance can help pay for the personnel providing these services during the first 51 months of a center's operation. And what is even more important, this staffing assistance is available to center programs that do not need to build new facilities; programs are eligible for assistance for any new service that they add that had not been provided before.

Here again, the Federal funds are not to be used to lessen the responsibility of the State or the community. They will be available on a declining basis as the center develops its own financial resources.

In the area of mental retardation, the situation is somewhat better; a mental retardation facilities plan for Rhode Island has been submitted to the Public Health Service. And this plan projects 13 facilities for communities in the State, based on a division of Rhode Island into four regions.

But you, as members of the Rhode Island Association for Mental Health, know that plans are nothing without execution. As members of one of the oldest mental health associations in America, you are aware that the Federal Government cannot be the complete rich uncle in providing for our State's needs—nor would you want it to be—and you are aware that your volunteer action cannot be the full action, either.

One of Rhode Island's greatest needs—perhaps her greatest need—is for informed, interested leaders who can recognize opportunity and seize it.

We have had such opportunities in the past, but the truth is that we have simply not taken adequate care of our mentally ill and mentally retarded fellows. We have not taken care of our disturbed children. We have not taken care of our troubled adolescents. We have often ignored mentally retarded children. We have not taken care of the aging citizens whose mental health may be failing. We have done less than our best for those with problems of alcoholism, of suicide, of drug addiction.

Of course, Rhode Island is a small State, but the problems of mental illness and mental retardation are proportionately no smaller in Rhode Island than in any other State. Frankly, I can see no excuse for the lack of action that has typified Rhode Island during the two years since passage of the 1963 legislation.

Our goals are clear. Of this, we can have no doubt. John F. Kennedy did not exclude Rhode Island when he sent his message on mental illness and mental retardation to the Congress in February of 1963. He said: "This situation has been tolerated far too long."

In fact, as he continued in the message, his words could be used then—as they can today—as a specific indictment of Rhode Island.

The situation "has troubled our national conscience—" he said "—but only as a problem unpleasant to mention, easy to postpone, and despairing of solution."

In Rhode Island today we can no longer accept the unpleasantness of our situation as a reason for keeping quiet about the mentally afflicted.

In Rhode Island today we cannot postpone action simply because it is easy to do so.

In Rhode Island today we cannot despair of a solution—for we have the tools to fashion a solution. We have only to make use of those tools.

I cannot stand by, watching the other States move ahead of Rhode Island. I cannot allow my State to remain out of step in this National march against the afflictions of mental illness and mental retardation.

Unfortunately, the persons who suffer from these afflictions are unable to band together to demand the improvements, the assistance, the compassion they must have.

We must give voice to those demands for them. And I feel very strongly that this should be the primary task of the Rhode Island Association for Mental Health.

You and I together must make our Rhode Island leaders realize that they have not exercised the use of our modern knowledge, our modern prosperity, our modern benefits either to reduce the incidence of these maladies or to take enlightened and humane care of the persons who are suffering from them.

We are falling behind in Rhode Island. The qualities of leadership that will put us in our rightful place among all the States are vitally needed today. My fervent hope is that we shall soon see these qualities in action.

And my firm resolve is to continue my fight until that hope is realized. I urge you to join with me.

## Viet's a Dollar War as Well as Shooting

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH

OF KANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 26, 1966

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, the relationship between the war in Vietnam and our international investment is of major interest and concern to me. Ray R. Eppert, chairman of the board of Burroughs Corp. was recently interviewed for the Chicago Tribune by the economist Elliot Janeway. Mr. Eppert's responses to the questions put to him are clear, to the point, and worthy of the attention of every Congressman and Senator. Mr. Janeway's article follows:

VIET'S A DOLLAR WAR AS WELL AS SHOOTING  
(By Elliot Janeway)

NEW YORK, May 4.—The normal rule of war is that it suspends business as usual. But now, it is all too clear that the normal rules of war don't apply in Viet Nam. Militarily, it's too small a war to get in the way of business as usual. But, financially, it's too costly a war to be allowed to get in the way of business as usual. In fact, the rising cost of the war is putting America under pressure to beat the earning norms of business as usual. To finance the shooting war in Viet Nam, we need to keep our lead in the economic competition everywhere.

Napoleon sneered at England as "a nation of shopkeepers." But she beat him in the markets of the world—where we are on the defensive now. Money alone can't win a war, but lack of it can lose one. We are learning the hard way what the Chinese war lords meant over the years by "silver bullets."

The dollar bullets we are fighting with today are made of paper, and they do the job in the world power struggle that "silver bullets" used to do in the world of Fu Man-

ch—with immeasurably greater impact. To assess how we are doing as a nation of shopkeepers in a world of sharp traders, this column interviewed Ray Eppert, head of the world-wide Burroughs corporation, a pioneering veteran of the international economic competition.

#### POINTING ON FIRST DOWN

JANEWAY. Do you agree with present recommendations aimed at pulling back our investment operations—by limitations on investment, not only overseas but here at home, and by tax increases?

EPPERT. I do not. I don't think that there is much difference between athletic competition and economic competition. No football team ever wins by punting on first down. No country ever scores in the marketplace by trying to earn less. I hope that we will try to earn more from our exports and foreign operations. The only way we can do this is to invest more in overseas markets, not less.

JANEWAY. How do you explain the failure of intelligent men to agree on such a sound and simple American objective?

EPPERT. We have had things so easy in this country that we have failed either to recognize or to implement the rule that is standard operating practice in every other country doing well—that every country has two economies, one for domestic operations and the other for international competition. The "two-economy" rule requires two monetary policies, one for our domestic economy and the other to maximize world trade. We are in trouble because we are trying to make the same policy fit both sets of problems. Actually, if we were earning more abroad, we would be under less pressure to cut back at home.

#### TWO-PRIORITY ACTIONS

JANEWAY. What is your prescription for curing our overseas earnings complaints?

EPPERT. There are quite a number of actions which are urgently needed, and I think that there are two which should be given high priority.

JANEWAY. What are they?

EPPERT. The first is action to recognize that our external economy must have special and consistent treatment, and not be subjected to or affected by every domestic breeze or whim. Secondly, the way to achieve our objective of international "equilibrium" is by selling our way to proper balance.

JANEWAY. Are you saying that we must not only continue to invest overseas, but also increase direct exports from this country?

EPPERT. Right. And this requires us to do as well by our exporters as other governments are doing by theirs. Our banking system needs a new arm—for extending credit on export orders at an export prime interest rate. Businesses can't tie up their working capital by financing exports to the detriment of their domestic credit, and the average businessman will not get involved in exports if he has to negotiate individual loan projects in Washington. Export financing needs to be routed thru the commercial banks, and the banks should be able to re-discount this paper in Washington at a discount rate established for exports. This would be similar to the banking discount privilege with the federal reserve on domestic paper, except that the time periods would be considerably longer. Such a simple procedure would create and promote incentive to export, and would help greatly to solve the problem of selling America into a proper international monetary balance.

JANEWAY. In essence, you are saying that the time is overdue for America to get off its defensive by taking the initiatives which its position justifies and requires.

## Parcel Post Wrapped in a Crazy-Quilt of Regulations

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. W. J. BRYAN DORN

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 23, 1966

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, the following article by Alan Emory recently appeared in Anderson, S.C., Daily Mail: [From the Anderson (S.C.) Daily Mail Mar. 16, 1966]

#### PARCEL POST WRAPPED IN A CRAZY-QUILT OF REGULATIONS

(By Alan Emory, North American Alliance)

WASHINGTON.—A business firm in Buffalo, the second largest city in New York State, cannot mail a parcel post package weighing 21 pounds to Jersey City, the second largest city in New Jersey, because the two cities are more than 150 miles apart.

A resident of Wainwright, Alaska, population 253, above the Arctic Circle, however, 4,200 miles from Buffalo, may order three items that were too heavy for the Buffalo-Jersey City mailing, having them put in one carton and mailed by parcel post by the Buffalo firm.

Mrs. Lawrence F. O'Brien, wife of the postmaster general, recently wrapped a gift for her sister-in-law, a resident of Westfield, Mass., and brought it to a Washington, D.C., post office, gave it to a clerk and asked for the postage amount.

The clerk looked at the 20-pound package a moment, pulled out a tape measure and measured it, found it was 14 inches wide, 14 inches deep and 23 inches long.

"Sorry," said the clerk, "we can't accept it," and he pulled out a copy of the postal regulations to back his argument.

Mrs. O'Brien pointed out someone had mailed a larger package to an address at Hampden, Mass., less than 10 miles from Westfield.

"Well, it's easy to explain," said the clerk. "Westfield is a first-class office; Hampden is a second-class office."

Then Postmaster O'Brien heard about the quick-switch post office.

Mailings were large enough to advance it to first-class status July 1, 1961. This led to restrictions on the size of parcels that could be mailed, and office revenues dropped so fast that by July 1, 1963, it had been reduced to second class again.

A local company recommended widespread mailing, and revenue rose so fast the office was advanced to first-class status again last July 1.

Customer reaction has varied from "indignation" to "disgust" to "anger" to "frustration" to "typical government logic."

One postmaster commented it was "a hardship for Grandma wanting to send a tricycle and can't because it is 'too big.'"

This kind of thing happens "literally millions of times a year," according to O'Brien.

Even though nearly 750,000,000 parcels are mailed annually, he says, an estimated 20,000,000 potential patrons are turned away from mailing more packages because of present restrictions.

A manufacturer in Tucson, Ariz., cannot send an item weighing 70 pounds and measuring 100 inches in Helena, Mont., which has a population of more than 20,000, but he can mail it to Silver Bow, Mont., with fewer than 5,000 residents.

A Dallas businessman can mail an item of similar size to nearby villages and hamlets, but not to buyers in larger cities like

Omaha, Neb.; Kansas City, Kansas, or Bradford, Pa.

O'Brien's files are full of cases like that of the couple from Hammond, La., who wanted to mail identical 25-pound Christmas packages to their two sets of parents. The husband's parents reside in Baton Rouge, and there was no problem. His wife's live in Shreveport, but weight and size restrictions blocked that mailing.

The Post Office Department says that it operated a uniform parcel post system before a 1951 law, with packages less than 70 pounds and 100 inches eligible for mailing anywhere in the country.

It blames the "precarious financial position of the Railway Express Agency" for the 1951 restrictions. Rural areas, which did not get much R.E.A. business, could keep the old limits, but shipments between first-class offices were limited to 20 pounds and 72 inches if they were more than 150 miles apart and 40 pounds and 72 inches if less than 150 miles apart.

The postal system, according to the postmaster general, "is serving to block and to constrict an important area of commerce."

He pointed out to Congress this week that while the economy was expanding about 50 per cent between 1953 and 1965, the volume of parcel-post mailings dropped from 6,000,000,000 pounds to 4,300,000,000.

The villain of the piece is that 1951 law that placed the current restrictions on parcel post, and O'Brien maintains "the public paid excessively for the adverse effects . . . too many patrons have been turned away from the only small-package service available to them."

Ironically, according to Deputy Postmaster Gen. Frederick G. Belen, the restrictions have hit the farmer and rural areas hardest of all. Congress was most concerned about the farmer back in 1912, when it put the parcel post system into effect.

O'Brien wants Congress to pass a law setting uniform limits of 40 pounds and 100 inches for packages mailed from one first-class post office to another, higher parcel post and catalog rates, simplified postal computations and a parcel-post service that is self-sustaining.

President Johnson has told the postmaster general he wants to see a marked improvement in the quality of postal service.

O'Brien says that in the past 14 years farmers and businessmen have been forced to pay more than half a billion dollars to ship small parcels to provide "a privileged sanctuary to one company, the Railway Express Agency."

## Joint AFL-CIO Maritime Union Position

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 26, 1966

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks I would like to include in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the testimony of Mr. Paul Hall, president of the Seafarers International Union of North America, before the House Committee on Government Operations, of which I am a member, on H.R. 13200, to create a Department of Transportation.

Mr. Hall's statement follows:

May 26, 1966

extending its record of technical assistance.

In addition to significant progress in conservation districts and small watershed projects there are other activities in my own congressional district that merit commendation.

For example, it was through the impetus provided by the Wake County Soil Conservation District that the present statewide effort got underway to get utility rights-of-way seeded for erosion control and to provide better wildlife food and habitat.

The Nash County Soil and Water Conservation District, in addition to joining the utility right-of-way project, has undertaken a number of other activities to stimulate local residents in the conservation effort, including the selection of an outstanding conservation farmer each year and holding poster and other contests in the schools.

These efforts are examples of the enduring results our people achieve through imagination, local initiative and cooperation.

The feasibility of these sound, supplemental local approaches to a universal problem is gratifying. In this case, it is especially fitting that this is so in the State that gave us Hugh Bennett and the first soil conservation district in the world.

**Vietnam**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. WM. J. RANDALL**

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 26, 1966

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Speaker, I am sure all Members receive a lot of mail on the subject of Vietnam, some of which comes to us directly and we receive some of it indirectly, by letters that go first to the editor of some of the papers in our district. After these letters are printed, invariably many of our constituents take the time to clip these letters and forward them on to the congressional offices. This has happened in our district many times.

The other day we noticed in the editorial column of the Clinton Eye, Clinton, Mo., a letter from the wife of a fighting man in Vietnam. It seemed to me the ideas expressed in this letter were so clearly thought out and well presented, they deserved to be shared with the other Members of this body.

Mrs. Larmer, of Clinton, Mo., points out that her husband has written that when the going gets rough, he tries to remember how it would be to live under a Communist government with its constant oppression and without the freedoms we take for granted.

Our constituent points out quite impressively that there is a way that the wives and relatives of the men fighting in Vietnam can help on the home front and that is to exhibit an extra amount of patience and maintain tranquility when

everything seems to be going wrong. Mrs. Larmer so very well states that patriotism can include such things as standing for truth and honor; by being continuously loyal to our beliefs and dealing honestly with our neighbors, as well as defending the principles that have made our Nation great. The letter as printed in the Clinton Eye, Clinton, Mo., is as follows:

CLINTON, Mo.,  
May 11, 1966.

The Editor,  
The Clinton Eye,  
Clinton, Mo.

DEAR SIR: Jim is in Vietnam now. I can't even fathom the hardships he must be enduring, but know he feels his job is important and that he's needed.

His letters tell of the thanks they receive from the Vietnamese people after he has helped treat their diseases and wounds.

I guess I'll never understand war, and because I'm selfish wish he didn't have to be there, but am proud he does his job willingly, and without complaining of the tremendous heat, insects, mud, stench, and other terrible conditions.

He said when the going gets rough, he thinks how it would be for us to have to live with a Communist government, and how life would be for us under oppression and without the freedoms we now take for granted. Those freedoms, after all, are our birthright and he's glad to be able to help another nation attain what has long been ours.

Sometimes people say they wish they could do something—carry a gun—join right in the fighting, so I've thought a lot about what would be a practical way to help in a positive manner.

I, too, want to be a real part of this, but have no ambitions to carry a gun since I know nothing about them. I'm not a banner carrier nor demonstrator, because it's my opinion that isn't the way to stop a war nor win it. But I think we can take other action.

We can fill our homes with as much love as possible—teach our children love for others, for our nation, our God.

If we can have an extra amount of patience, understanding and kindness for our neighbors and family; if we can keep from being too busy (or too lazy) to show those around us we really care; if we can maintain a semblance of tranquility when all seems to go wrong and help make someone's cares lighter, isn't that a start in helping to fight this war?

For, I believe freedom is a spirit. The spirit of people's hearts, many hands working together, dreams that became realities, a soul finding joy or solace in prayer.

Jim, only one of many men, is standing for truth and honor in a place strange to him and so far from those he loves. I want to do the same thing here. Call me patriotic or sentimental, or whatever you like—even nuts. But I want to try to be continually loyal to my beliefs, expressing that through everyday acts such as: Co-operating with those around me; dealing with them honestly, and defending the principles that have built our nation.

We face a great challenge, and I believe we must start at home to meet that challenge to maintain the freedom we enjoy every day.

I'm proud to be the wife of a fighting man in Vietnam and pray that God will give me the strength and wisdom to carry on without him for awhile. It also is my prayer that he will continually protect our men, allowing them to return safely to us, where they again can enjoy the rights and freedoms of our beloved land—knowing they have helped keep it so.

Sincerely,  
Mrs. JIMMY V. (MARTHA) LARMER.

**High Court Should Not Sit in Past**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. ANDREW JACOBS, JR.**

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 26, 1966

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, Ralph McGill, publisher of the Atlanta, Ga., Constitution, is a great southerner and a great journalist.

Recently, he wrote a column which discussed the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in our changing and contemporary society.

Some critics, McGill writes, suggest by their statements that—

The dead hand of the past must relentlessly hold us in its grasp, no matter what the changes.

Yet, he points out that it has been the rulings of a responsive Supreme Court which have served the "American promise and dream."

The Indianapolis Star on May 18, 1966, performed a genuine and constructive public service by printing Mr. McGill's column under the heading, "High Court Should Not Sit in Past."

Under unanimous consent I insert the text of the column at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

**HIGH COURT SHOULD NOT SIT IN PAST**

(By Ralph McGill)

By a happy—and revealing—coincidence, Senator SAMUEL J. ERVIN, JR. (D-N.C.) spoke at a bar association meeting the evening before "Law Day, U.S.A." was celebrated by the law school students and faculty at Emory University in Atlanta, with United States Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas as the speaker.

The coincidence provided the symbolism of light following darkness, of hope replacing defeatism, of the dead past trying to speak for the living present. Senator ERVIN's view of the meaning of laws is, if one judges from reports of his address, that of mechanical details: "Thou shalt brush thy teeth at least twice daily," "thou shalt not spit on the sidewalk," etc.

"Laws," he said, "are designed to furnish rules of conduct for government and people."

But are they? Is that what we really mean by the majesty and breadth of the word "law" and the phrase "due process of law?" Hasn't the senator used a beautiful, wide fabric of principles woven by the laws of centuries to wrap up municipal ordinances and all the petty ambiguities of "states' rights"?

The senator doesn't like the U.S. Supreme Court. He sees its "whims" replacing "laws." He deplores and views with alarm the fact that the Supreme Court of today may overrule one of 1860, 1840—or any "past decision."

Surely the senator does not mean that the dead hand of the past must relentlessly hold us in its grasp no matter what the changes? Is it a "whim" of the U.S. Supreme Court to rule that if a large percentage of the people move to cities, the states may not continue to give the depopulated areas the same representation as those with many more citizens? Is the "one man, one vote" ruling a "whim" or is it an upholding of the supreme constitutional guarantee of a republican or representative form of government?

The 13th, the 14th and the 15th amendments have been in the U.S. Constitution for about 100 years. Beginning in the late 1870s and continuing into the 20th Century, they were largely nullified by court rulings and political and economic pressures, mostly from the financial centers of the East and North. Is it, let us ask ourselves, merely a "whim" that these amendments are declared valid?

Senator Ervin's fears are as old as the nation. He is saying the same things that were said of the Supreme Court in John Marshall's time—only not so strongly. From that day to this, rulings that have served the American promise and dream have been condemned by the fearful and the greedy. Yet, can anyone deny that individual rights and dignity are more strongly delineated today than ever in our history?

Fortas' talk was inspiring. It breathed confidence in the American dream of a country where each citizen enjoys equal protection of the law, where there are no discriminations in voting and in an equal sharing of opportunity and education, and where we try to alleviate and get at the causes of poverty.

Justice Fortas believes we do subscribe to this sort of country because of the great principles of law in the Constitution and its amendments—also because they and our religious origins have given us a sense of moral consciousness about the individual. It is these principles of law, not the police court rules or the states' laws governing conduct, that enable us to "channel this evolution of our free society into the broad banks of the law."

Fortas looks forward with hope and confidence. He was neither petulant nor defeatist. Senator Ervin was, it seemed, plaintively looking backward.

### Our Man of Peace

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

#### HON. RICHARD BOLLING

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 26, 1966

Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, on May 9, 1966, a group of friends of former President of the United States Harry S. Truman gathered at the invitation of Mr. Henry Talge, philanthropist and industrialist of Kansas City, Mo., to observe President Truman's 82d birthday.

On this occasion, special tribute was paid President Truman for his constant and continuing efforts toward seeking to achieve world peace. Students from 71 foreign countries brought their greetings.

Mr. Leonard H. Marks, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, delivered the principal tribute to President Truman; a brief address titled "Our Man of Peace."

Mr. Speaker, I believe Mr. Marks' speech will be of great interest to our colleagues:

#### OUR MAN OF PEACE

(Remarks by the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, at the observance of President Truman's 82d birthday, May 9, 1966)

Harry S. Truman served his country as President at one of the great watershed in the history of the Republic.

Rushing events of global significance posed problems for the American chief executive of momentous import and concern. Abroad, much of the world lay shocked in the cruel aftermath of a great war—peoples destitute, governments broken, economies shattered, vast colonial lands restive, aggressive appetites in some quarters unappeased—and men everywhere looked to America for help and hope. At home, the nation was engaged in the colossal and complex move from war to peace; major efforts were launched to improve the people's welfare and to strengthen civil rights; and all Americans found themselves asked to adjust to the mantle of world power and leadership.

What qualities did Harry Truman bring to office? Somehow they seemed to be those most representative of the American spirit: courage, confidence, ingenuity, faith, humor, frankness, a concern for others.

James Bryce wrote of the American people: "Nor do their moral and religious impulses remain in the soft haze of self-complacent sentiment. The desire to expunge or cure the visible evils of the world is strong."

Such desire was certainly strong in the 32d President. His constant search for peace and freedom and for rising levels of prosperity did not stop at the water's edge. He sought all this for all men, and under his leadership the quest was well rewarded.

He put the weight of his office firmly behind plans for a concert of nations, and, at the opening of the United Nations Conference at San Francisco, he advanced the view that: "We must build a new world, a far better one in which the elemental dignity of man is respected."

In 1947 he enunciated the Truman Doctrine: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." There followed economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey which enabled those countries to resist successfully such outside pressures.

That same year his administration laid the groundwork for launching the Marshall Plan, which supplied American assistance for the reconstruction of war-ravaged countries and the peaceful and stable reconstitution of their societies.

He journeyed to Brazil to participate in the Rio conference and to tell the delegates that his country would stay strong militarily in order to be able to wage the peace. Under his direction the Berlin blockade was blunted and the city saved. In 1949 he took the United States into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—an establishment created to deter aggression and to allow continued free European progress, a vision so brilliant and successful that today we see a strong and peaceful Europe. Then in 1950 when the communists struck with stealth at South Korea, President Truman, with United Nations support, committed American might to that country's cause.

Perhaps one of Mr. Truman's best points was his fourth one. As point 4 of his 1949 inaugural address he stated: "We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and the growth of under-developed areas in the world." That program of U.S. assistance has continued on down to this very day.

He also backed the principle of firm international control of atomic energy and at the same time he encouraged the expanded use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

And all this time at home he fought for what he believed was right to achieve greater abundance, strengthened civil rights, and wider social benefits—such as medical care for the aged.

Because of Harry Truman, millions around the world, who might otherwise not be, are free today.

So, to this man of peace, we say with affection and gratitude, in the well-known words that closed his meetings with the press, "Thank you, Mr. President."

### Communism Can Be Defeated

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

#### HON. W. J. BRYAN DORN

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 23, 1966

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, in all of our confusion today concerning Vietnam, the U.S.S.R. East-West trade, and scores of life-and-death issues there are a few sturdy and consistent voices which continue to emphasize the realities of the conflict situation and the means to cope with Red totalitarian aggression toward definite victory in the unceasing cold war. One such voice is Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, professor at Georgetown University and also chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee.

Dr. Dobriansky's main theses are: First, most Americans, in official and private positions, still do not understand the Soviet Union and the nature of Soviet Russian imperio colonialism, second, this lack of proper understanding with regard to the power center of the Red empire breeds policies which are detrimental both to the captive nations and our own security interests, and, third, our continued failure to take psychopolitical warfare seriously will inevitably lead to more needless sacrifices of lives and treasure and to an extended list of captive nations, now numbering 27.

Recently, these points were discussed over the nationwide Manion Forum. I request that the full text of the broadcast, titled "Communism Can Be Defeated," be printed in the RECORD, followed by a report on it in the May 9 Chicago Tribune issue, under the caption, "Urges U.S. Campaign Behind Iron Curtain":

[From the South Bend (Ind.) Manion Forum weekly broadcast]

COMMUNISM CAN BE DEFEATED BY "WARS OF LIBERATION" IN THE CAPTIVE NATIONS

(By Dr. Lev Dobriansky, chairman National Captive Nations Committee)

Dean MANION. My friends, a few weeks ago I invited Dr. Lev Dobriansky, Professor of Economics at Georgetown University, in Washington, to talk to us about the possibilities for peace through international trade and through a proper understanding of the many captive nations now enslaved by the Communists all over the world. Dr. Dobriansky's broadcast was so popular with all of you that I have asked him to come back. He is here today to explore this subject further.

Doctor, when you were here a few weeks ago, you were talking about the possibilities for peace through the liberation of the captive nations. Now, the Communists are always promoting what they call "wars of liberation" in Viet Nam and elsewhere; is this what you are talking about in reverse, or not?

## PLIGHT OF THE SMALL FARMER

(Mr. TALCOTT (at the request of Mr. HORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter and tables.)

[Mr. TALCOTT'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

## ELLSWORTH URGES VIETNAM POLICY

(Mr. ELLSWORTH (at the request of Mr. HORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, there is still time for the Johnson administration to shape up in South Vietnam or get out. But time is running short.

Marshal Ky declared the day before yesterday, on May 24, 1966, that the South Vietnamese elections which are now scheduled for September could be held only if secure and stable conditions prevailed in South Vietnam at that time. Ky has thus laid the groundwork for a further postponement of elections and the continued reign of instability throughout his country.

It is imperative that the Johnson administration make it absolutely clear, now, to the Ky regime in South Vietnam, that the elections must be held on schedule. I have been urging President Johnson to make clear to the leaders in South Vietnam that either they get together, stop fighting each other, and start fighting the Communists, or the United States will get out of Vietnam.

A clear, strong, and unmistakable statement to this effect by the Johnson administration, accompanied by contingency plans for withdrawal, would have one of two results. First, if the feuding South Vietnamese leaders faced the hard fact of imminent U.S. withdrawal and did get together to form a reasonably stable, united and representative government, the war against the Communists could then be pursued with maximum effect—and the American commitment to a united South Vietnamese Government would have meaning and purpose. Second, on the other hand, if the South Vietnamese leaders choose to continue their civil war in the face of imminent U.S. withdrawal and to ignore the need for united action against the Vietcong, then the United States would be fully justified in removing its forces—our withdrawal would be honorable, for the sacrifice of American lives would have lost its meaning and purpose.

Those who now read of Marshal Ky's show of strength should not be deluded into thinking that stability has been achieved. The history of the last 30 months demonstrates conclusively that a government in Saigon based on military power alone is inherently unstable:

November 1, 1963: President Diem was overthrown and replaced by a government under former Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho.

January 6, 1964: A three-man military council under Gen. Duong Van Minh took over from Tho.

January 30, 1964: A military coup replaced General Minh with General Khanh.

February 8, 1964: General Khanh formed a new government with General Minh as chief of state.

August 16, 1964: General Khanh ousted General Minh, established a military council and proclaimed a new constitution.

August 27, 1964: General Khanh withdrew the constitution and reinstalled General Minh in the military council.

August 29, 1964: New caretaker government established with Nguyen Xuan Oanh as acting premier.

September 3, 1964: General Khanh became premier again with General Minh as chief of state.

September 13, 1964: Coup and countercoup removed and then reinstalled General Khanh.

October 26, 1964: The revolutionary council elected Phan Kahc Suu as chief of state.

November 1, 1964: Tran Van Huong was named premier with a military council.

January 27, 1965: Coup relieved Huong of power; military council asked General Khanh to solve the political crisis; Oanh was chosen as acting Premier.

February 16, 1965: Thang Huy Quat replaced Oanh.

February 18, 1965: Khanh was ousted from the military council.

February 19, 1965: Khanh resumed power.

February 21, 1965: Khanh resigned.

June 12, 1965: Quat asked the military to take over the government and restore stability; Marshal Ky and his military directory came to power.

Marshal Ky's own regime has, of course, been riddled by popular dissatisfaction and civil war. No one can view this history without concluding that General Ky can gain short-range police state stability only at the expense of long-range political stability. He cannot buy political stability at the point of a gun when the Buddhists represent 75 percent of the people of Vietnam.

What is missing in the efforts to form a stable South Vietnamese Government is a compelling reason for the feuding anti-Communist factions—political, religious, and military—to form a representative government to fight the Vietcong—their common enemy and the greatest threat to their nation.

What is missing is the insistence by the Johnson administration that if the South Vietnamese leaders do not unite to form a government the United States will withdraw. The Johnson administration must adopt a policy which will either induce the feuding South Vietnamese to create political stability or lay the basis for an honorable U.S. withdrawal if they do not.

The sacrifice of American lives will have no meaning if the South Vietnamese leaders prefer to fight each other rather than to join battle against the Vietcong. The Johnson administration must make this abundantly clear. And if the South Vietnamese leaders fail to reach agreement on a representative government

the United States should get out of Vietnam.

From the Johnson administration, since the inception of the Vietnamese conflict, the American people have heard many optimistic statements:

In March 1963, General Harkins, then our commanding general in South Vietnam, stated that the South Vietnamese Armed Forces had "all that is required for victory."

In May 1963, the Pentagon told us: "The corner definitely has been turned."

In October 1963, Secretary McNamara said:

The major part of the military task can be completed by the end of 1965.

Early in 1964, Secretary McNamara told Congress that neither more combat troops nor more money would be needed in South Vietnam.

Late in 1965, Secretary McNamara, returning from a personal inspection of Vietnam, said:

We have stopped losing the war.

The Johnson administration has created a credibility gap between itself and the American people. The Johnson administration has failed to make its objectives in Vietnam clear to the American people. It has failed to make its objectives clear to the leaders in South Vietnam. It has failed to insist upon stability in Saigon as a necessary prerequisite for continued American involvement in the war. And it has failed to make an adequate effort to move the Vietnam conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

For months I have been consulting on the Vietnamese situation with the highest officials in our Government: in the Foreign Service, in the State Department, in the Pentagon, and at the White House itself. I have discussed the crisis at length with some of the ablest and most distinguished journalists in our country. I have sought out the views and opinions of foreign and military policy experts both within the Government and outside.

The time has now come for decisive action by the Johnson administration. Neither the war nor the peace can be won in Vietnam without stability in Saigon and diplomacy in Washington. The administration must confront Saigon with the hard facts of life—either they get together to fight their common enemy or we will get out.

Mr. Speaker, I presented this position to the people of Kansas in an address in Great Bend on April 23 and again at Wichita State University on May 16. By unanimous consent, I include my speech in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

On May 21 the able and distinguished Governor of Kansas, our former colleague, the Honorable William H. Avery, spoke in plain terms to the American Legion convention in Wichita, calling for a reexamination of our position and our commitment to South Vietnam. Numerous newspapers and columnists, in Kansas and across the Nation, have echoed a substantially similar position. I also include these additional materials in the RECORD.



MELSWORTH CALLS FOR NEW LOOK AT VIETNAM  
POLICY, MAY 16, 1966, WICHITA STATE  
UNIVERSITY

It is now time for the Johnson Administration to shape up in South Vietnam or get out.

As a Member of Congress I have repeatedly voted for measures to support our Armed Forces in Vietnam and to give the President all the authority he has asked for.

But I am rapidly losing confidence in this Administration's ability to see to it that our military operations are effectively backed up by the necessary political stability in Saigon. This, in turn, has undercut our efforts to move the Vietnam conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

Over 400,000 people have already been killed in this war—yellow, white, and black. More than 3,000 Americans have been killed.

We now have 300,000 Americans on the scene in Vietnam, and by the end of the year, we will probably have 500,000.

Helicopters, air support, and modern fire-arms give our troops in Vietnam four to five times the striking power our soldiers had in World War II.

We have already dropped the equivalent of a ton of bombs for every Viet Cong soldier.

Since 1954, we have given over three billion dollars in aid to South Vietnam.

In March, 1963, General Harkins, then our Commanding General in South Vietnam, stated that the South Vietnamese Armed Forces had "all that is required for victory."

In May of 1963 the Pentagon told us: "The corner definitely has been turned."

In October, 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara said: "The major part of the military task can be completed by the end of 1965."

Early in 1964 Secretary McNamara told Congress that neither more combat troops nor more money would be needed in South Vietnam.

Late in 1965, Secretary McNamara, returning from a personal inspection of Vietnam, said: "We have stopped losing the war."

A credibility gap exists between what the Administration tells us and what actually happens.

After all these years, all these efforts, and all these sacrifices, there is no evidence that the American presence has brought political maturity or political stability to the people or the government of South Vietnam. Just the opposite is the case: anti-government riots have shown an alarming influence in the very cities we and the South Vietnamese regimes have claimed to control. The spring of this year has seen chaos, turmoil, and rioting in the streets of South Vietnam, and curtailment of our military operations because of it.

Soldiers and officers of the South Vietnamese Army have removed their uniforms and put on civilian clothes in order to participate in anti-American riots.

At the height of the riots, we began for the first time to experience a higher death rate among our own American troops than the South Vietnamese forces were sustaining themselves. The anti-Communist South Vietnamese were so busy wrangling among themselves that they didn't have time to fight the Communists.

The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese are close to winning the conflict in Vietnam on the political front.

Here at home, our Vietnam expenditures are largely responsible for the inflation that wrecks our own country, for material shortages, and for government interference in wage and price decisions. The Vietnam War is a profound threat to our whole economy. When Chairman Gardner Ackley of the President's Council of Economic Advisors was before the Joint Senate-House Economic

Committee on February 1 this year, discussing the President's Economic Report, he admitted in response to a question from me that he was "either ill-informed or a poor guesser about the trend of Vietnam expenditures."

Our dollar outflows to Vietnam accounts for more than half of our present annual balance of payments deficit.

No matter how much military power we focus in South Vietnam, no matter how magnificent the moral of our fighting men is, no matter how much effort and sacrifice they pour into the Vietnamese conflict, and no matter how much strain is put on our own society here at home, it will all be wasted unless the South Vietnamese can be effectively organized on a political basis. This the Johnson Administration has failed to do.

The political initiative in South Vietnam, in the sixth year of our American presence there, now rests with the anti-Americans.

If there is a single vital lesson to be drawn from our experience in Vietnam, it is that foreign aid for economic development plus foreign aid for military development are practically useless without a strong program of political development among the people we are trying to help. Unless the people of a country can learn to participate in politics—to band together for community projects—to build the forms of citizen action, which we in this country take for granted and which have been the source of our progress—unless the people of a country can do these things, then all the money in the world for economic development, and all the bombing and killing of which we are so clearly capable, cannot bring much progress or much stability. This lesson of Vietnam the Johnson Administration still has to learn.

Lack of political cohesion among the anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam is and has been for a long time our most immediate and pressing problem. The Johnson Administration has failed effectively to do very much about it.

This Administration must now make it perfectly clear to all political leaders in South Vietnam—religious and military alike—that we do not intend to fight on in Vietnam unless they can get their own house in order, stop fighting each other, and start fighting the Communists.

Neither the American people nor the Congress will support the war in Vietnam much longer, unless the South Vietnamese are required to and do make an effective effort to establish political stability.

The sacrifice of our men's lives can have meaning only if our purpose is clear and our efforts are not wasted.

I, therefore, propose:

1. The Johnson Administration must immediately ask and get reasonable political stability in South Vietnam; otherwise, we must prepare to withdraw and quit wasting the efforts and sacrifices of our troops and our people.

(a) The original agreement to hold elections in August for a Constituent Assembly to draft a national Constitution should not be delayed to September or October or some later date, despite "trial balloons" along that line recently floated from the Ky regime in South Vietnam.

(b) It must be made clear that we expect the Constituent Assembly to complete its task in a specified and reasonable length of time so that a representative government can be established.

(c) We must insist that the leaders of all major anti-Communist religious sects subordinate their differences to the immediate task of fighting the Communist threat to their freedom, if they expect us to help them.

(d) A firm pledge of loyalty to the government must be exacted from each military officer in the Vietnamese Armed Forces, with compelling sanctions against violation of such pledges.

(e) We should also require, from all the main factions, pledges of full cooperation in broad and intensive programs for educating the urban and rural people of South Vietnam so that a foundation is laid for them to be able to control their own destiny.

If the government and people in South Vietnam are unwilling to make and keep these pledges, the United States should withdraw its forces. We are not there to impose our will on the people of Vietnam. If the government and people of Vietnam are not willing to take the minimum steps necessary to achieve enough political stability so that they can fight effectively, then the sacrifice of American lives will serve no purpose.

2. At the same time the Johnson Administration must renew and redouble its efforts to move the Vietnamese conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table. This, however, it must do against a background of reasonable political stability in South Vietnam and by the use of real and meaningful diplomacy.

Real and meaningful diplomacy is not the use of grandiose public relations efforts. A truce in Korea was made possible not by the dispatch of big-name Presidential envoys to hold press conferences in far-flung capitals of the world, but by a President who convinced the Communists that he sincerely desired to bring an end to the conflict.

The Suez Crisis was resolved, not by a flamboyant appeal for a U. N. debate which was never followed up by a real debate, but through a sincere effort to seek U. N. help to avoid a world crisis.

Successful negotiations for a test ban treaty did not come through spectacular Presidential journeys to Honolulu or other exotic spots, but through quiet, tough, patient diplomacy.

The twin pillars of peace in Vietnam are stability in Saigon and diplomacy in Washington. Peace cannot be secured without both.

It is now time for the Johnson Administration to require reasonable political stability in South Vietnam and to move the Vietnamese war from the battlefield to the negotiating table, or to get out of Vietnam.

[From the Wichita Beacon, May 16, 1966]  
MOVE TO DEMOCRATIZE VIETNAM LAID ASIDE

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

WASHINGTON.—Inside the national security apparatus of the government early last autumn, a project was started—then laid aside—with deep implications for the war in Viet Nam.

The project was a major effort to democratize the South Vietnamese government. As put together by senior officials in the White House and State Department, the object of the plan was to hurry free elections, both the selection of a constituent assembly and the election of a national assembly.

However, the project was put in cold storage. At that time President Johnson's advisers were more interested in "pacification" of South Viet Nam including social reconstruction and reform—a program to woo peasants in the hamlets and commit their loyalties to the Saigon government.

It was felt then that both pacification and political reform would just be too much for the military government of Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky to apply itself to simultaneously, while still fighting a shooting war at the same time. Pacification was given top priority, and political reform was put on the back burner.

In hindsight, top government officials now concede privately that their priorities were wrong. If there had to be a choice, they now believe, the effort should have been put on political reform. The price of this error in judgment is the continued political turmoil which is undermining U.S. popular support for President Johnson's policy.

Of course, it should be quickly stated that adoption of the political reform six months ago would have carried no ironclad guaranty against the political agitation this spring in Viet Nam. Indeed, there is no sure-fire protection against political opportunists like the Vietnamese Buddhist leaders.

Nevertheless, had a national assembly been in existence a month ago when the Buddhist campaign against Prime Minister Ky began, it would have provided a far more orderly forum of protest than the streets of Saigon. And in that event, top officials here believe, Americans would better understand such protests.

In the opinion of official Washington, the most damaging aspect of the political tumult in South Viet Nam has been its erosion of popular support for the war in the United States. Even though the political crisis has now simmered down, there is a vague grass roots resentment in this country, on grounds that the great sacrifice of American blood and treasure in Viet Nam is totally unappreciated by the Vietnamese.

Ironically, this loss of support at home comes at a time of impressive military progress. There is a growing conviction that the once-invincible Communist Viet Cong, badly stung in encounters with U.S. troops, are now seeking to avoid Americans.

Yet, military successes, while one essential part of the Viet Nam equation, certainly cannot solve the whole problem. Nor can pacification and reconstruction. The vital need is political stability among the various South Vietnamese political factions, and this is precisely the area in which Washington has directed the least effort and derived the least benefits.

Pessimists believe there is no better than one chance in ten that elections when finally held, will yield truly representative government and satisfy the various factions of Buddhists, Catholics, the military and other segments of that unhappy country. Those not satisfied are apt to take to the streets in demonstrations, or worse.

But the U.S. is strictly limited in what it can do. Washington received only a few hours notice of Ky's dismissal of Gen. Thi, which set off the current crisis. Nor can it control what is said today by Ky, an aviator, not a politician. All that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge can do is to make sure that Ky is "terribly impressed" (in the words of one top U.S. official) that every word he utters will be dissected back in the United States (as were his comments about staying in office for another year).

Yet, there is a temptation to wonder what might have been if that political reform project of six months ago had been followed out. It was a chance that may never be regained.

[From the Washington Post, May 1, 1966]

#### VIETNAM IN KANSAS

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

A hardfought battle on the plains of Kansas for the Republican nomination for the United States Senate is turning into a referendum on President Johnson's Vietnam policy.

The early stages of Representative ROBERT ELLSWORTH's attempt to take the nomination away from incumbent Sen. JAMES PEARSON revolved mainly around personality questions. But a week ago, ELLSWORTH injected the Vietnam issue in a speech at Great Bend.

While not suggesting that the United States drop its Vietnam commitment, ELLSWORTH rapped sharply at the Johnson Administration for neglecting political aspects of Vietnam and concentrating too much on the military. His charge that President Johnson is to blame for our present predicament drew heavy applause. In contrast, PEARSON has generally supported Mr. Johnson in Vietnam.

[From the New York Times, May 18, 1966]

#### WASHINGTON: THE EVADED MORAL QUESTION IN VIETNAM

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, May 17.—President Johnson has been confronted for some time with a moral question in Vietnam, but he keeps evading it. The question is this: What justifies more and more killing in Vietnam when the President's own conditions for an effective war effort—a government that can govern and fight in Saigon—are not met?

By his own definition, this struggle cannot succeed without a regime that commands the respect of the South Vietnamese people and a Vietnamese army that can pacify the country. Yet though the fighting qualities of the South Vietnamese are now being demonstrated more and more against one another, the President's orders are sending more and more Americans into the battle to replace the Vietnamese who are fighting among themselves.

#### THE TWO OPTIONS

Ever since the start of this latest political crisis in Saigon, the President has had before him two courses of action. The first was to make clear to all the contending South Vietnamese leaders that the United States was going to limit its reinforcements, its military and economic aid, its casualties, and its military operations to the minimum until they had composed their differences.

The objective of this course was to try to produce unity, and failing that, to provide time for a basic reappraisal of the American commitment.

The second course was to appeal to everybody to get together and meanwhile to keep the war going as best we could with the American forces. President Johnson chose the second course. He is appealing and fighting, though he has even less reason to believe in the formation of a stable government now than he had at the beginning of the crisis.

#### WHAT JUSTIFICATION?

Justifying this historically, and particularly, justifying it personally to families of the casualties in the coming monsoon offensive will not be easy. If there were a reasonable expectation of political stability, the thing might be done, but lacking that, it is hard to see why the President rejected the course of a defensive pause.

The latest review of the war here with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge did not deal primarily with fundamental policy, but with operations. It did not focus on where we now stand or where we mean to go from here, but on what to do about the inflation and the shipping in Saigon, and the tactical problems in Danang and Hue, and how to pump a little more sawdust into the ruling generals in the capital.

There is little reason to believe that President Johnson's latest "appeal" to the Buddhist leader, Thich Tri Quang, will have any more effect than the other innumerable appeals that have been made to that militant monk by other Americans in the last few weeks.

He is clearly not thinking much about putting aside "the lesser issues in order to get on with the great national tasks." He is summoning his followers to new demonstrations against the military junta in Saigon and the generals in the Government are moving troops of the Seventh Infantry Division out of the operations against the Communists to deal with the expected rioting in the capital.

Plenty of appeals have been made by President Johnson, among others, to General Ky, to "compose his differences" with the Buddhists and get on with the formation of a civilian government, but his answer to that was first to increase his military

power by kicking out his rival general in the First Corps area, and lately sending his marines to Danang and bringing the country to the verge of civil war.

It may be that, in the face of all this petty and provocative folly, President Johnson is playing a waiting game and being more clever than anybody here can see. What he will do if his latest appeal to Tri Quang is ignored and followed by more chaos in the streets remains to be seen.

#### WHAT COMMITMENTS?

At one point, however, if the present trend continues, there will have to be a new definition of all the commitments that have been given. Our commitment to Saigon originally rested on Saigon's commitment to fight and govern, neither of which it is now doing effectively. The President's commitments in this war involve not only a handful of generals who seized power, but involve the Vietnamese people and the American people as well.

Our commitment was to a "legitimate government" and what we now have in Saigon is neither "legitimate" nor a "government." Our commitment was to help them win the war not to replace them on the battlefield. Our arms were provided to fight the aggressors and not to start a civil war. Our promise was to help South Vietnam, not to destroy it.

[From the Washington Post, May 19, 1966]

#### INSIDE REPORT: THE DOUGLAS-PERCY BATTLE

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

KANKAKEE, ILL.—At the very moment President Johnson was vigorously defending his Vietnam policy Tuesday night before a \$100-a-plate black-tie dinner in Chicago's cavernous McCormick Place, a different kind of political gathering was taking place in Kankakee 55 miles to the south.

Nearly 300 local Republicans pushed back from a ham-and-beef supper at the Kankakee Civic Auditorium to hear Charles H. Percy, Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate, open his speech with these words:

"Under President Eisenhower, the record is that for eight years, we were not engaged in a war. Americans were not being shot at."

Percy then went on to reel off a lengthy indictment of President Johnson in Vietnam: failure to go to the United Nations before the resumption of bombing in North Vietnam. Refusal to fully inform the public about the war. Spread and escalation of the war. Convening of the "impetuous and ill-advised" Honolulu Conference. Inability to get our allies to send troops to Vietnam.

The repetition of such charges throughout the state as the long campaign begins means that liberal Republican Chuck Percy has found, for the moment at least, the issue in his drive to unseat three-term liberal Democratic Senator PAUL DOUGLAS.

It is the Vietnam issue that has reduced the highly popular DOUGLAS, the best Democratic vote-getter in this state's history, to no better than an even bet against Percy. One secret survey delivered to Percy recently by an Eastern pollster shows the race at this early stage to be a virtual dead heat.

This is particularly worrisome to the White House because DOUGLAS, a staunch anti-Communist, has been one of the Senate's most dependable supporters of Mr. Johnson's Vietnam policy. Consequently, any widespread feeling that this stance could cost DOUGLAS his seat might start a Nation-wide stampede of Democratic candidates away from the President's position. For this reason, the President's political visit to Chicago on Tuesday will not be his last trip in behalf of DOUGLAS.

On the political balance sheet, however, the asset of Mr. Johnson's support seems outweighed by liabilities stemming from Doug-

May 26, 1966

las's Vietnam stance. Some fickle liberal Democrats, forgetting DOUGLAS's long record in behalf of social welfare legislation, are refusing to support him in this campaign because of Vietnam. A few go so far as volunteering to work for Percy.

Moreover, Vietnam is having the effect of smoothing over Percy's long quarrel with the right-wing Bourbon Republicans, of Illinois, whose animosity contributed mightily to his defeat for governor in 1964. Even among the Bourbon there is more support for the Percy line (which flatly opposes expansion of the war) than for the Barry Goldwater-Richard Nixon formula of accelerated bombings.

After his Kankakee speech Percy was confronted by one Bourbon-type precinct captain, who allowed he would have liked to hear some blasts against inflation and higher Federal taxes (not included in Percy's speech) but was all for Percy's position on Vietnam. "We can't save the whole world with our money and our boys," was the comment of this conservative Republican.

In fact, such comments are about all that Percy hears in after-speech conversations, question-and-answer sessions and street corner handshaking. Even during an expedition into working-class saloons on Chicago's West Side by Percy last Saturday night, he heard complaints about Vietnam.

Some Republicans feel Percy is playing with fire in concentrating on Vietnam. One competent political professional, managing the campaigns of a dozen Republican congressional candidates in the Midwest, has advised them to keep still about Vietnam and talk about inflation instead. His reason: Mr. Johnson may somehow radically change the Vietnam situation before election day.

But for now, the unmistakable rising tide of public resentment against the dirty little war seems to be hurting PAUL DOUGLAS. After easily turning aside Republican charges of "socialism" and "radicalism" in three previous Senate campaigns, he may be beaten this year as a hard-line anti-Communist.

[From the Manhattan (Kans.) Mercury, May 19, 1966]

IF TROUBLE STAYS, U.S. EFFORTS MAY BE LOST

WASHINGTON.—Some of the best informed U.S. officials now fear prolonged political violence in South Viet Nam could undermine the whole basis of the American war effort there and force this country to reconsider its Vietnamese policies.

A deepening sense of worry and frustration has become evident among policymakers here in recent days.

The Johnson administration is still hopeful that the ruling military directorate in Saigon, headed by Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, and rebellious Buddhists and military elements at Da Nang and Hue can patch over their differences quickly. Both sides have been warned that they are endangering American support.

But in administration quarters there is less talk than there was during earlier outbreaks of violence this year that the South Vietnamese are merely suffering political growing pains. There is more anxious speculation that their differences may be too deep to be reconciled and, even if apparently composed, soon will erupt again.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's statement Wednesday specifying limitations on the amount of U.S. help that will be given to developing nations is being interpreted by some authorities here as underscoring in policy terms the diplomatic warnings to South Vietnamese leaders disclosed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk at a news conference Tuesday.

Rusk said the South Vietnamese were being told that "their own attitude, their own solidarity, their own efforts are crucial elements in the combined (American and

Vietnamese) determination to get on with the fight against Communist conquest.

McNamara, in talking about U.S. aid to underdeveloped countries in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Montreal, said American security is related to the security of developing nations and when they request help they may get it.

But he also noted:

"Certainly we have no charter to rescue floundering regimes, who have brought violence on themselves by deliberately refusing to meet the legitimate expectations of their citizenry."

At another point, he declared: "Our role must be precisely this: to help provide security to those developing nations which genuinely need and request our help, and which demonstrably are willing and able to help themselves."

[From the Lawrence (Kans.) Daily Journal World, May 20, 1966]

#### TIME TO LEAVE?

The recent conduct of the South Vietnamese and their various factions has forced increasing reassessment of United States policy regarding the Asian country.

And not only in Washington but all over the country, more thought than ever before is being given to the feasibility and practicality of an American withdrawal from the strife-torn region.

For a long time now, we have been hearing that various outbreaks and conflicts among South Vietnamese factions like the Ky Administration and the Buddhists were basically superficial and more or less "growing pains" of a nation striving to find itself in the democratic scheme.

But analysts now admit that experts on such matters are beginning to speculate openly that these differences may be too deep to be reconciled and may continue to erupt and grow in severity.

And here is where rise is given to more consideration to a sharp change in U.S. policy.

The United States went to Vietnam in 1954 at the request of that government, to help advise the South Vietnamese in the process of fighting off the Communists and developing a democratic society similar to ours.

The "government," however, has changed often and on short notice, and the Ky regime represents the eighth change in the past three years. Furthermore, the Ky Administration is a military organization supposedly set up to run things only until civil authorities can take over and establish stability and consistency.

Civil-religious groups, such as the Buddhists, take a dim view of the military regime and are opposing it, often violently, to the point where an all-out civil war could break out soon. Americans who supposedly have been fighting on behalf of both factions could be caught in the middle. The end result is that the U.S. forces might have to kill not only the Communists but the Ky people and the Buddhists and everyone else the Yanks were supposedly sent to Asia to help.

Going into a country at the request of a government to help establish law and order and to combat aggression and Communism is one thing. Getting involved in a civil war is something else. Suppose the situation should become so hot that the U.S. is forced to fight for its life and has to establish a military dictatorship of its own to get out of the hodge-podge of selfishness and uncertainty? How would our image look then?

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who has long defended our role in Viet Nam, apparently has misgivings of his own about the way things are going now. He said just this week. "Certainly we have

no charter to rescue floundering regimes who have brought violence on themselves by deliberately refusing to meet the legitimate expectations of their citizenry. \* \* \* Our role must be precisely this: To help provide security for those developing nations which genuinely need and request our help, and which demonstrably are willing and able to help themselves."

So far, South Viet Nam has given no concrete evidence of being demonstrably willing and able to help itself. The government changes hands regularly and the various factions remain so selfish that they cannot sublimate their own particular whims to the point they can work with anyone else.

It is tough enough to help a people in a case like this when those people have unity, singleness of purpose and a determined will to get a job done. Even with all this, the South Vietnamese problem would be tough because of the constant pressure and harassment from the Communist troublemakers.

But the South Vietnamese do not have such dedication, and do not appear on the verge of acquiring it for years.

In principle, the Ky Administration is undesirable where a democratic future is concerned. History shows that the longer a military group is in power, anywhere, the greater the abuses and the more likelihood of a totalitarian system eventually coming to the fore. Yet the Ky group sees nothing better in the offing and is reluctant to relinquish control.

In principle, the Buddhists, who oppose a military junta, are right. They understand what can happen and want no more of the Diem-type dictatorship which they were instrumental in unseating.

But even though these and other groups allegedly interested in democracy for South Viet Nam are right, all seem so self-centered that they refuse to work together and create the kind of cooperation necessary.

What business has the United States, even a benevolent United States, in a chaotic situation like this?

Some leaders keep saying we were asked there and must meet our commitment; and others keep talking about how Communism will overrun Asia if we pull out of South Viet Nam.

But to whom are we committed at this point? There is no semblance of the "government" that asked us to go over in the first place. Thus all we are doing is spending money and, more important, lives, to try to bring order out of a chaos which the South Vietnamese don't seem to have enough character, courage and determination to want to dissolve.

Then we hear the ethereal argument about how great will be our loss of face if we pull out of Viet Nam now.

France left Viet Nam in the early 1950s thoroughly beaten by the Communists, yet does France's image suffer much today?

Furthermore, the United States certainly is holding its own and often is winning in the conflict against the Communists. We are not doing as well as some government spokesmen say we are, but even so we are anything but defeated the way France was.

France also had a long record of colonial exploitation in Viet Nam. The U.S. has no such status and desires none.

In view of the turmoil in South Viet Nam and our standing in the war with the Communists, the United States would appear to be in a good spot to get out of Viet Nam now and stop its always-costly, often-tragic operation there. The sooner the better.

Unless the South Vietnamese themselves show a lot more backbone than they have in their so-called fight for democracy and dignity, then we are foolish to stay and be scapegoats for every faction that happens to have a crusade.

May 26, 1966

Americans in Viet Nam frequently hear the familiar "Yankee, Go Home!" The time may be at hand to oblige them.

[From the New York Times, May 20, 1966]  
**JAVITS LINKS AID TO VIETNAM UNITY—SAYS  
CONTINUED U.S. EFFORT DEPENDS ON STABLE  
REGIME**

(By Alfred E. Clark)

Senator JACOB K. JAVITS said last night that if the South Vietnamese could not establish a "stable government" the United States might have no alternative but to withdraw its forces.

Speaking before a liberal party group at the Astor Hotel, Mr. JAVITS declared that "under no circumstances should the United States, in effect, 'take over' South Vietnam."

He asserted that the Johnson administration "should not try to dictate a solution or support any particular faction or man."

The Senator spoke before the political group's committee-at-large, which is composed of persons associated with the city's civic, community, cultural and business affairs. Stuart Scheffel, chairman of the committee, presided and about 250 persons were present.

Although the State's senior Senator is a Republican, Mr. JAVITS has been an ardent exponent of President Johnson's approach to the problem of South Vietnam.

Unlike his junior colleague, Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY, a Democrat, Mr. JAVITS has constantly defended the position taken by the administration while Mr. KENNEDY has been a constant caustic critic.

#### "A MAJOR STATEMENT"

Last night Senator JAVITS's talk, which followed recent trips to Vietnam, Latin America and Europe, was characterized by his staff as a "major statement on the Vietnam crisis."

He proposed a four-point program for elections in South Vietnam "to insure the freedom and legitimacy of the elections and the earliest possible establishment of a civilian government."

The proposals were:

A cease-fire during the election period.

Supervision of the elections by an international body.

Guarantee of universal suffrage by secret ballot as the basis of participation in the elections.

Transformation of the Constituent Assembly into an interim Parliamentary Assembly, once the work of the former in producing a constitution has been completed. The interim Parliamentary Assembly should be authorized to establish a caretaker civilian government until new elections are held under the Constitution.

He said that there was a limit to the patience of the American people with regard to the factional strife among the South Vietnamese "and this limit could be fast approaching."

Senator JAVITS called upon President Johnson to make clear to the leaders of the strife-ridden country "that our assistance is naturally contingent upon the tenability of the position of our forces." He added:

"If they cannot put an end to their personal drives for power and concentrate on their mutually agreed common enemy, we may have to take this as a signal that our aid may no longer be practicable."

"This country should not interfere in the internal politics of a nation we are trying to help to secure freedom. Such interference could only be against the very purpose we are there to serve."

[From the New York Times,  
May 20, 1966]

#### BLOW THE WHISTLE ON SAIGON

The eruption of fighting in Danang between Saigon's forces and pro-Buddhist ele-

ments demonstrates the extreme delicacy of the American position in South Vietnam, despite the presence of a quarter-million United States troops and vast sums of economic aid.

Secretary Rusk has let it be known that American officials for days have been urging the Vietnamese to halt the power struggle and settle their differences through elections. This advice has been ignored, particularly by Premier Ky. The United States is being caught up in a war within a war—and American planes are being shot at by the people they are trying to help.

The question Washington must face is how long it can permit its counsel to be flouted. With Saigon concentrating on internecine feuding, American troops are being forced to carry the brunt of the anti-Communist struggle; their casualties now are beginning to exceed those of the South Vietnamese Army.

Senator Mansfield has warned the United States to "keep our hands off" the internal conflict in South Vietnam and this is good advice as far as it concerns an attempt to dictate which faction wins. But there is no reason why the full weight of American influence—and this means going beyond words, when words are disregarded—should not be brought to bear to restore peaceful processes.

So far, the American answer to political chaos in Saigon at almost every turn has been to step up American military action. In the summer of 1964 Premier Khanh was promised a bombing offensive against the North, presumably on Presidential authority, to extract pledges from Saigon of governmental stability and efficacy. When the bombing of the North finally began the following winter, its primary objective—as explained by the highest American officials in Saigon—was to stabilize the politics of South Vietnam. The open engagement of American aircraft in the South, the introduction of American combat troops, the commitment of those troops to ground battle in Asia and the subsequent build-up to levels that have turned an aid commitment into an American war—all these steps have been justified as underpinning for the Saigon Government as much as by the need to fight the Vietcong.

This course of action clearly has failed. It has always been likely that the more the United States assumed responsibility for the war, the more irresponsible the Saigon Government would become. The time is now, if it is not already too late, to reverse this process. First steps toward a withdrawal of American troops to their bases in Vietnam—rather than a cut-off of economic aid, which would only penalize the helpless civilian population—undoubtedly would bring Saigon to its senses.

Premier Ky has violated the agreement negotiated with the Buddhists to abstain from force and to proceed rapidly toward elections, constitutional processes and the formation of a representative government. There will be no "arrogance of power" but a mere facing of facts if President Johnson now blows the whistle on Saigon instead of continuing the present policy of *laissez-faire*.

REMARKS BY GOVERNOR WM. H. AVERY TO THE  
AMERICAN LEGION CONVENTION, BROADVIEW  
HOTEL, WICHITA, KANS., May 21, 1966

Probably no year in the 47 year history of the American Legion has a state convention met in a period of greater frustration and greater indecision in regard to foreign policy and national defense than in the unhappy year of 1966. Never in my experience in public life or as a private citizen have I seen dissension at the policy-making level and among the electorate that we are today witnessing everywhere about us. I want to make it abundantly clear that I do not make these observations from a point of criticism, but only from the standpoint of expressing con-

cern as to the direction our national affairs will take in the months that are ahead.

Division and lack of common purpose seem to have invaded the legislative department of government at the national level. It is in the public interest that all aspects of a foreign policy decision and the consequences that result therefrom should be fully understood by the American people before a commitment of our prestige and military power is made. In the situation today, however we appear to have gone beyond the point of open and constructive debate.

The unique factors in the situation I see today are threefold:

1. The dissension in the legislative branch of government comes largely from within the same political party as that of the Chief Executives. I do not know of any similar circumstances since the uneasy days of the Civil War.

2. There is also disagreement among our friends in the group we describe as the NATO nations, largely made up of the countries of the free world. This is not altogether surprising as the alliance is now more than 20 years old and forces have regrouped and attitudes have shifted considerably in this period. During such a period of transition, it is no surprise that these member nations would have different problems, different perspectives and different aspirations than they did following the end of World War II. Nor withstanding this reasoning, it still must be comforting to the Communists to learn that we have been put on notice to remove our forces from France by April 1, our traditional ally.

3. The most critical aspect of all is that our military strength is committed to defend a far away nation which apparently has no sense of unity, no understanding of nationalism and no discernible goal for themselves. I am referring, of course, to the South Vietnamese. The recent civilian disagreements and strife there have reached such a stage that it would seem to justify the reexamination of our position and our commitment to that country.

I do not have any confidential or classified information on which to base these views, but it seems abundantly clear from the news media, that the recent events in the political and religious environment of that country that have altered the nature and extent of our commitment. The picture that we saw there a month ago of a nation resisting an enemy is not the picture we see today where one native countryman turns on his fellow.

I am not suggesting that a compromise with the Viet Cong or any other Communist force be negotiated. Any change in our position or our stated objective cannot be based upon our failure to meet the Communist aggressor. Our American forces have never retreated because of fear of the enemy. The new question in this most complex and complicated picture is whether or not the lives of American soldiers can be committed to save a nation that cannot decide for itself if it wants to join American soldiers in fighting the aggressor or would prefer to draw apart and engage at the same time in a Civil War for reasons not clear to me.

It is one thing to commit the military might and the armed forces of America to protect a weak nation against Communist aggression. It is an entirely different matter to provide an umbrella or shield for a people that is unconcerned and would prefer to enjoy the luxury of civil strife rather than to unite with our armed forces to repeal the enemy.

We are there by invitation of the South Vietnamese. Now we can ask who can truly speak for the Vietnamese people.

I am not unmindful of the most unpleasant position in which the President of the United States and his advisors find themselves in this year of decision. As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the

May 26, 1966

United States, he has difficult decisions to make. Further, as President he is chief architect of our foreign policy and it is not possible to make a distinction between principal foreign policy and military strategy in the Southeast Asian dilemma. This expression of understanding, however, does not in any way diminish the implications of the events that have taken place in the last few weeks.

Questions logically arise whether prolonged civil strife may put a greater burden of fighting on American troops in the country and whether American forces, already battling the Viet Cong, may be caught in the middle between warring factions of the South Vietnamese.

American combat deaths exceeded those of South Viet Nam's armed forces last week for the third time this spring, a period of political unrest.

I submit that the reasons for being in Vietnam, which I supported, do not necessarily obligate us to remain under these recent unpleasant and inexplicable developments.

Drawing these decisions and the consequences of these decisions to a state level, there are several obligations for us to perform. There are a few decisions on the state level that directly or indirectly affect our Kansas boys who have returned and, we hope soon will return, from Vietnam. The 1966 amendments to the Veterans Readjustment Benefits Act, become a matter of concern to the Kansas Veterans Commission, the American Legion and all other service organizations with a special interest in veterans. The Kansas Veterans Commission has already made special effort to advise Vietnam veterans, as well as peacetime veterans whose service was rendered subsequent to January 31, 1965, of opportunities that have now become available to them as a result of the above-mentioned amendments to the Veterans Act. I know that this will be covered in greater detail by other speakers at this convention.

In a related matter, I recommended and the legislature approved, a new hospital facility at the Fort Dodge Soldiers Home. It became increasingly evident to me that the age group of veterans served by this facility required an increasing amount of medical services. The State of Kansas makes its principal contributions in assisting veterans through the operation of the Fort Dodge facility. No only is the present medical facility obsolete and inadequate but additional residence accommodations could be made available by utilizing the present hospital for patient residents. It is estimated that the present hospital could be converted to a patient residence to accommodate 45 residents. It should be pointed out that 87% of the patients at Fort Dodge were previous veteran patients at state hospitals.

This in turn makes the bed at the other treatment hospital available to another veteran or another citizen who can be helpful or rehabilitated at the institution where professional psychiatric care is available. The legislature approved the appropriation which was to be matched by federal funds.

After the President requested governors to defer any major construction that was not considered necessary, the question arose whether or not the federal matching funds would be available for this authorized addition to the Fort Dodge home. In order to clarify the status of the available federal funds, a few weeks ago I wrote to Farris Bryant in the Executive Office of the President, who serves as liaison to governors on matters affecting federal-state relations.

On April 22, I received a letter from Mr. Bryant which I will quote here in part: "In response to your question about deferral of your new medical facility, the President has refrained from establishing priorities on specific grant projects because of the many

factors that continue to influence the States' capital improvement program. However, I can say that the President's desire is not to cut back essential welfare or medical projects and your medical facility appears to fall in this category. The final decision must rest with the States and the Governors."

I am announcing this afternoon that it is my decision, unless reversed by the Kansas legislature, to continue with our planning for the Fort Dodge hospital improvement. This appears to be consistent with the view expressed for the President by former Governor Farris Bryant, director of the Office of Emergency Planning. I know that this project has been high on the priority list of the American Legion of Kansas for at least ten years. I am happy that we were able to obtain legislative approval of this during the budget session just recently adjourned.

[From the Washington Daily News,  
May 23, 1966]

#### DISILLUSIONMENT ABOUT VIET NAM WAR: "LET'S GET OUT" TREND WORRIES LBJ

(By R. H. Shackford, Scripps-Howard staff writer)

The Johnson Administration is alarmed by the growing disillusionment among Americans at home about Viet Nam.

This disillusionment coincides with plans to increase the number of American ground forces—to "at least 400,000"—in that war.

More demands for "getting out" are feared if the South Vietnamese continue to fight among themselves and leave the war to be fought by American troops.

But the Administration is trying to hide its fears even the President Johnson told one of his rare press conferences Saturday that no one wanted to get out more than he. "Leading that parade is the President," he said.

Behind the scenes, Administration officials—who decline to be named or quoted—are explaining eroding public support for the President's policies by claiming that the civil war situation is not as bad as portrayed by the press.

But House Republican leader GERALD FORD of Michigan suggests that it is the President who is not "leveling" with the American people about the crisis.

The Administration now is counting on Premier Nguyen Cao Ky to succeed in putting down by force the dissident military and religious groups in Da Nang. Officials seem to hope that once Da Nang is suppressed, the rebellion and turmoil will face away.

But these officials are aware that the spectacle of South Vietnamese killing South Vietnamese has caused serious damage to the attitude of American public opinion. This is reflected in polls and in congressional statements (even by "hawks").

Administration officials don't go so far as to blame news reporting from Viet Nam for the decline in support of Vietnamese policies. But they do claim newspapers and television have kept the nearly three months of political turmoil and civil war out of perspective.

For example, they say the press ignores the fact that there is no civil strife in the countryside. But they fail to explain that most of the countryside has been controlled by the Viet Cong for a long time.

The following week-end developments explain why President Johnson and his top associates are trying to calm public alarm:

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, former Ambassador to Viet Nam and now a presidential adviser, who tried to belittle the crisis by saying "we don't need to wring our hands over this unrest," also said: "we will probably need more people (in Viet Nam) and I believe we would at least reach a manpower strength of 400,000." There are 255,000 American ground forces there now.

Chairman L. MENDEL RIVERS, Democrat, of South Carolina, of the House Armed Services Committee who is a "super-hawk," said:

"We may have to make a decision damned soon about whether to pull out altogether. \* \* \* I'm getting tired of it. His colleague, Chairman RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Democrat, of South Carolina, of the Senate Armed Services Committee has been showing increasing impatience, too.

For the first time, support of the President's policies in Viet Nam dropped in the Gallup Poll to less than 50 per cent—to 47 per cent with 35 per cent disapproving. An even more disturbing poll on Sunday showed 54 per cent favoring U.S. withdrawal if the South Vietnamese start fighting among themselves on a big scale and 72 per cent in favor of "getting out" if the South Vietnamese stop fighting the Communists.

Casualty figures continue to show that Americans are doing most of the fighting against the Viet Cong. During three of the last six weeks, American deaths exceeded those of South Vietnamese soldiers, and total casualties—killed, wounded and missing—for Americans have been two to three times higher for the South Vietnamese force which is more than twice as large.

Senator JACOB JAVITS, Republican, of New York, warned that if the South Vietnamese cannot do the major fighting (which they haven't been doing), then "we have no alternative but to withdraw." He said that point hadn't been reached yet but it "now seems possible" the U.S. may have to face it.

Reports from Saigon that Premier Ky probably will win his "civil war" in Da Nang encouraged the Administration. But how much it will allay public alarm at home depends more on Ky's dubious ability to unite all the warring political, religious, sect and regional factions.

The Administration fears that disillusioned Americans will look with frowning disfavor on vastly increasing American ground forces and escalating the war unless there is some semblance of political stability—and that is unlikely. If the war becomes increasingly an American war, the mood at home could become increasingly anti-war.

[From the Washington Post, May 25, 1966]

#### DOUBT, FRUSTRATION RISE AMONG AMERICANS IN VIETNAM

(By Stanley Karnow, Washington Post Foreign Service)

SAIGON, May 24.—Only a few months ago, to question the wisdom of U.S. policy and practice in Vietnam was to invite snarls from most Americans here.

These Americans, immersed in the blood, tears, toll and sweat of the Vietnam conflict, understandably opposed any talk that smelted of surrender.

Today, however, that sense of determination has altered to a perceptible mood of doubt, frustration and even disgust—a mood generated by the complex, confused political strife that has been roiling this country.

#### PULLOUT NOT ADVOCATED

By no means does this feeling signify that Americans here advocate U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam tomorrow. But it has set them to wondering if they can give this situation the patient, persistent involvement it requires.

More and more, Americans who once considered negotiation a defeatist term, now ruminate aloud on "how we get off the hook" here.

The struggle between Premier Nguyen Cao Ky's government and the Buddhist rebels has left an impression that the rival Vietnamese factions are more concerned with fighting each other for power than with fighting the Communists.

#### APPEAL BY RUSK

It has lent a certain irony to Secretary of State Dean Rusk's appeal last week to the disputing Vietnamese to "set aside their lesser issues" and get on with the war. And it has revived the question, posed here often over



the years, whether it is possible to save people who are not primarily focused on their own salvation.

"We want to win this war more than they do," is the way some Americans put it. Implied in that statement is whether it is worth the effort.

A U.S. Marine officer near Danang asks, for example, how he can decently order his men to risk enemy fire to extend their perimeter—while back in the city, the Vietnamese they protect are busily killing one another.

At the same time, several American officials here have been depressed by their own incapacity to control or even comprehend Vietnamese actions. How Ky was able to send three entire Vietnamese battalions to Danang last week without American knowledge is one of the sweetest mysteries of late, particularly since U.S. advisers went with the troops.

Such lack of intelligence is matched by a deep ignorance about key Vietnamese figures. A random poll of U.S. diplomats here will reveal that the Buddhist leader Thich (Venerable) Tri Quang, as powerful a man as any in the country, is (A) a Communist, (B) an anti-Communist, (C) a Communist dupe, (D) a nationalist patriot.

Compounding this murkiness have been visible divergences within the U.S. mission on which of the rival Vietnamese groups to support. While Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge has apparently sympathized with Ky, the Marine commander in Danang, Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt, has sheltered Ky's opponents.

Another discouraging strain here has been the growing anti-Americanism, especially among Buddhist youth groups. Much of this stems from the traditional Chauvinism prevalent in central Vietnam, where Buddhists are strong. It has also been animated by the social and economic disruption caused by having 285,000 American soldiers in Vietnam.

American backing of Ky has further stimulated Buddhist criticism of U.S. strategies in Vietnam. The other day, Buddhist students came out with the "three shames of U.S. foreign policy"—Hiroshima, Santo Domingo and Ky's crackdown on the Buddhist rebels in Danang.

#### DRAFT DEFERMENT TESTS

(Mr. ELLSWORTH (at the request of Mr. HORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, last March 29, Republican Congressmen joined me in a call for a congressional investigation of the draft. As a result of our continuing study into the Selective Service System, we have, this week, reissued a call for an investigation, and release six in-depth studies about problem areas in the draft system. Last week, I was delighted to come across an excellent editorial on the draft deferment tests. The editorial is all the more meaningful since it appeared in the "Stars and Stripes," which is the voice of the veterans in the United States. The editorial follows as an extension of my remarks:

[From the Stars and Stripes-The National Tribune, May 19, 1966]

#### DRAFT DEFERMENT TESTS

In all parts of the country, students are in revolt against the draft deferment tests being conducted by the Selective Service. Sit-ins are occurring at many universities and it is apparent that students feel that the one glaring deficiency in the test operation is that those who have financial means to attend universities are privileged over those

who do not have the necessary funds to attend college and therefore wind up as draftees.

There is much to be said for this point of view. We feel that the deferment examinations are not in accord with the best means of securing military personnel. Simply because some students do not attain high enough averages in college exams or are unable to go to college because of restrictions is no good reason for their becoming draft bait.

Many young men in college, particularly in their freshman and sophomore years find college work with its increasing demands extremely difficult. They just do not become adjusted until their last two years in universities. Neither do many of them have clearly defined ideas as to just what courses they want to major in. Under the present examination system this places them at a distinct disadvantage.

Another point at issue is the fact that apparently the Selective Service is the judge and jury. It seems to us that some of the decisions which will have to be made by the Selective Service boards will necessarily be open to question.

In view of continuing high academic requirements by colleges and universities it is extremely difficult for some young men to gain admittance to any college at the present time. Indications are that these requirements are increasing rather than decreasing. So it would appear that college officials, aware of the demands upon college students, should be the proper ones to make decisions as to scholastic grades, particularly if grades are to determine whether or not a student is to be drafted or to be deferred from the draft.

There seems to be sound logic in the contention that the present draft system is in drastic need of revision. The present system is a patchwork of legislative amendments enacted thru the years. A new and fresh approach to this most important problem is unquestionably needed at the present time.

#### THE 48TH ANNIVERSARY OF ARMENIAN INDEPENDENCE

(Mr. DERWINSKI (at the request of Mr. HORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, on Saturday, May 28, the courageous people of Armenia will observe the 48th anniversary of the day when their independence was proclaimed from Turkish and Russian rule. Tragically, they were unable to maintain their freedom because of the World War and the indifference of leaders of the free word to the Armenian cause.

Americans of Armenian descent are one of the most vigorous groups working in the free world for the restoration of independence to Armenia and the other nations suffering under Communist tyranny. I encourage them to continue their efforts to maintain the hope and faith of the Armenian people in the future, when they will regain the freedom for which they so vehemently long.

I also congratulate the many Armenian-Americans who have made such outstanding contributions to the culture and progress of the United States. They have proved to be unusually gifted in educational, political, artistic and economic fields.

Mr. Speaker, let us in the House of

Representatives rededicate ourselves to the cause of Armenia and the other captive nations under Communist rule and do what we can to aid these brave people achieve the freedom and self-determination which they are now denied.

#### THE 48TH ANNIVERSARY OF GEORGIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

(Mr. DERWINSKI (at the request of Mr. HORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, on this date in 1918, the independence of the people of Georgia was officially proclaimed by the Georgian Parliament meeting in Tiflis, the capital of the Georgian Republic. I would like to pay tribute to the freedom-loving Georgian people on this, the 48th anniversary of their declaration of independence.

Although 26 countries recognized the Georgian Republic, the nation succumbed to the military aggression of the Russian Communists who established their domination over the brave Georgian people before they were able to solidify their independence.

The history of the Georgian people is a long and honorable one, Mr. Speaker. They have retained their national identity throughout many centuries and have been Christians since the fourth century. In spite of their forced incorporation into the U.S.S.R., the brave Georgian people have maintained a vigorous nationalist spirit and anti-Russian attitude throughout their unjust domination by Soviet Communist forces. They vehemently oppose the dictatorial policies of communism and continue to hope for the day when democracy will be restored to their land.

Mr. Speaker, in recent years the Voice of America has been reducing both the number and length of broadcasts to the Georgian people. It gives only straight news because it is the policy of the Johnson administration not to offend the Soviet Union in any way. I believe that lengthier and more effective broadcasts which would pierce the wall of Communist propaganda and deliver the truth to the people of Georgia should be provided by the Voice of America. This agency should be a vehicle for delivering the message of truth to this brave people so that their resistance to Communist brainwashing will not weaken under the constant propaganda to which they are subjected by their tyrannical Moscow rulers.

I join the Georgian people who are suffering under Communist domination and refugees and their descendants from that land in observing today this anniversary of their declaration of independence. I also share their hope that the day will soon come when they can once again enjoy the freedom and independence they deserve.

(Mr. KEITH (at the request of Mr. HORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the

RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

(Mr. KEITH'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.)

#### LET'S GET EDUCATIONAL TV ROLLING AGAIN

(Mr. ROBISON (at the request of Mr. HORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced legislation to extend the program of Federal matching grants for the construction of educational television—ETV—broadcasting facilities, and to raise the present limitation which any one State may receive under this program from \$1 to \$2 million.

When this 5-year program was initiated back in 1962, nearly everyone was excited about it; it enjoyed both widespread publicity and strong popular support throughout the country. Now, only 4 years later, the Office of Education has come to Congress for its final appropriation under the terms of the present law; yet nothing has been done to continue this worthwhile effort.

Some progress has been made, but we are a long way from reaching the ultimate goals in the field of educational television. Although there are some States that have yet to take advantage of this program, several others have been severely hampered or even stymied by the existing limit of \$1 million for any one State.

New York State, for example is one of almost a dozen States who have already used their million dollars. One New York community has an application pending which cannot be approved because there are no funds available; another city, Binghamton, in my district, has received State funds but cannot progress any further toward Federal aid; and still a third city in the overall State plan will be ready to move soon—but cannot.

By the Office of Education's own estimates it will take 35 to 40 years to reach desirable levels of ETV coverage at the present rate of station activation; and the demand, exclusive of the States like New York that have been cut off, will exceed the funds available by some \$4 million next year.

As I said 4 years ago when voting for the original program:

In my judgment, this is a way to both improve and equalize educational opportunities—especially in those special subjects for which there is only a limited quantity of gifted teachers—to help bridge the gap between high-school and college—to aid in educating handicapped or sick children—and, equally important, improve the process of adult education, as well.

My bill would extend the existing program for an additional 5 years, authorize the expenditure of another \$32 million over that period, and raise the per-State limitation from \$1 to \$2 million.

I believe the need for this legislation is obvious, and I do not think we can afford to wait much longer before getting the wheels rolling again.

#### THE COSTS OF INFLATION

(Mr. CURTIS (at the request of Mr. HORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, the unusually large month-to-month increases in the Consumer Price Index since the start of the year makes the report of the Republican Coordinating Committee on "The Rising Costs of Living" timely reading. The report not only pinpoints the sources of inflation in expansionary Government fiscal and monetary policies but offers a program to restore stable growth.

Republican proposals to restrain Government spending and slow down the rapid increase in the money supply are as valid today as when they were made in March. It is true that some indicators, such as housing starts, retail sales and the stock market, may be signaling a cooling down of economic activity. Nevertheless, I believe an analysis of key factors in the outlook indicates a continuation of inflationary pressures and the need for restraint.

Those who predict a dropping off of activity compare the likely future performance of the economy with the first quarter, when GNP rose a staggering \$17 billion to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of \$714 billion. This was the highest quarterly rise since the Korean war. If this pace were to continue through the year, we would have galloping inflation that would make the need for restraint apparent even to the Johnson administration. In the first quarter of the year alone, one-third of the GNP increase was accounted for by price increases as opposed to increases in real output. A decline from this level of activity does not mean that inflation has vanished.

Last month's increase in the Consumer Price Index confirms the inflationary trend. Consumer prices rose 0.4 percent in April. From December through April, living costs have risen by 1.4 percent or by 4.2 percent at an annual rate.

Wholesale prices have also shown continued strength. From December through April, wholesale prices have risen an average of 1.3 percent or at an annual rate of 3.9 percent. The WPI, which was stable for about 7 years, now stands 3.7 percent above what it was a year ago.

Significantly, food prices have begun to level off while industrial commodities have been increasing in price. During the first 4 months of this year, industrial commodities rose at an annual rate of 3.3 percent. It appears that the period when the administration could put the blame for inflation solely on food prices has passed. Inflation today is broadly based throughout the entire economy.

The price indexes provide a measure of inflation, but what are the basic economic factors at work which indicate a continuation of the trend?

First, capital spending by U.S. business continues at a high rate. The most recent survey by McGraw-Hill of capital investment plans predicts an increase of 19 percent in 1966. This is 3 percentage

points higher than Government estimates made earlier in the year.

Second, imports increased a sharp 14 percent in the first 4 months of the year, while exports showed a gain of only 7 percent. Our trade surplus through April declined to 4.1 billion at an annual rate, which was significantly below the \$4.8 billion surplus of 1965 and the \$6.7 billion surplus of 1964. The Department of Commerce has admitted that one important reason for the decline, which is the key to our worsening balance of payments picture, is the rapid expansion of domestic demand. Not only does a high level of domestic output pull in more exports, but it also discourages businessmen from making greater efforts to open up new export markets.

Third, the money supply is increasing at a rapid rate. After increasing by 4 percent from 1964 to 1965, the compounded annual rate of change in the money supply from December through April was 6.8 percent. From February through April, the rate of increase was almost double this. Since last June the money supply has been increasing at a rate of almost 7 percent a year, which is the fastest rate for a comparable period since World War II. Bank reserves are also shooting up, with an increase at an annual rate amounting to almost 15 percent since February. Business loans, too, are increasing sharply at close to 20 percent annually.

Fourth, major collective bargaining agreements in the first 3 months of the year provided median first-year wage increases of 3.7 percent as well as average 3.7 percent increases over the full term of the contract. This does not include fringe benefits. In effect, the guideposts for noninflationary wage behavior have been abandoned in actual negotiations, proving the futility of "voluntarism" in an overheated economy. More serious from the standpoint of inflationary pressures is the fact that, as one writer put it, unions will be coming to the bargaining table next year "with blood in their eyes." Rising prices, high profits, and low unemployment put labor in the best bargaining position it has enjoyed in many years. Even worse, 1967 is a heavy bargaining year. During the first 6 months more workers will be represented at the bargaining table than in all of 1966.

Fifth, order backlogs—a critical inflationary indicator—have been soaring. At the end of March, backlogs were up to a seasonally adjusted \$70 billion. Since the beginning of the year, monthly increases in backlogs have regularly exceeded the increases of the previous month.

Sixth, the administration's hope that defense spending would level off in the second half of 1966 appears unsustainable in light of developments in Vietnam. In part, defense costs have been held down by reductions in inventory and by drawing on some of our combat strength in Western Europe. The need to restock and to train more men will cause an acceleration of defense spending over the next year, particularly if our troop commitment in Vietnam goes from 250,000 to 400,000, as many suggest it will. This